Despite the relevance, importance, strengths, and weaknesses of the views of Austin and Aquinas, both men are formidable forces in the historically progressing evolution of law as we understand it. Aquinas, having died more than five hundred years before Austin was born, was working from a different societal mindset. Born in a time highly influenced by ancient philosophers of natural law such as Cicero and Aristotle, Aquinas’ theories are deeply rooted in the ideals of higher-law and the natural growth and entwined relationship between law and morality (Feinberg/Coleman 7). Austin, on the other hand, was born into the “enlightenment” era where scientific observation played a key role in the positivist, descriptive understanding of law, separating the perceptions of socially established laws and morality. These two major branches of legal theory, Natural Law Theory and Legal Positivism, present the most substantive and preliminary arguments for the understanding of law; they ask and answer questions about the participation of morality within the legal system (Tebbit 12, 20). Natural Law Theorists like Aquinas claim there is an inherent relationship between law and morality which is necessary to comprehend the essence of law; Austin and the Legal Positivists deny this claim, believing that law can be understood fully apart from morality and its inherent implications (this is known as the “Separation Thesis”).
Both fields share the belief that law is “institutional.” This is to say that law is a necessary product of, organized as, or forming a social institution. In a sense, there are no places where humans group and live together where there are no laws. In these places, there are those who determine laws, such as courts, legislatures, chieftain, or royalty. Similarly, law is a sort of “social fact.” Not only does law seem to exist only for cohabitation and its institutions, but there seem to be no societies which exist without, or could presumably last for long without, law.
Another shared view is that law is “normative.” To be normative is to prescribe the norm or standard, meaning that law regulates behavior, dictating the normal (desired) actions of society. While many people simply try to live how they want to live despite the consequences, most look to law to decide how to act harmoniously with society doing what they want as far as it is lawful, or doing what they want as far as it is unlawful, but perhaps unlikely they will be caught or sanctioned. Law gives us reasons for behaving in the way law dictates, granting relatively safe and satisfactory living for compliance, and often threatening a sanction, or penalty for noncompliance.
The combination of these two characteristics of law can be problematic because in some sense, law may be understood to be dictated by man from the institutional viewpoint, and man may be understood to be dictated by law from the normative viewpoint. In other words, man decides what law does, by creating and enforcing them. Law, in turn, decides what man does by mandating actions or inactions, with the power to coerce through the power of sanctions (which can include the removal of the desired or the implementation of the undesired – which may often be seen as the same in cases of fines or freedom). That man dictates the content of law and law dictates the actions and inactions of man suggests a circular argument, which presses the question, “which came first?” Does man dictate law or does law dictate man (this can become a problem when the laws become outdated due to generational differences, or when the law is applied in an unforeseen context which is insufficient. Unconscionable acts may exemplify this situation). Because of the inclinations of these characteristics, Natural Law Theorists stress the normative in the belief that higher laws and morality guide us, and Legal Positivists stress the institutional with the stance that law is a creation of man, to use upon mankind, independent from morality.
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St. Thomas Aquinas presents four types of law: the Eternal, Divine, Natural, and Human. The Eternal regards the laws of the universe. The Divine are God’s laws. The Natural laws are those which apply to mankind, understood through proper reasoning, aimed at the good. The Human laws are man made laws, with the purpose to guide mankind to the Natural laws, formed from necessity to correct the apparent failure for those who do not recognize the Natural laws (Feinberg/Coleman 8 ).
“Consequently, every human law has just so much of the nature of law as it is derived from the law of nature. But if in any point it departs from the law of nature, it is no longer law but a perversion of law” (Feinberg/Coleman 9).
Aquinas’ Natural laws sometimes dictate what Positive law should be (he claims through logical deduction), and sometimes leaves room for human choice in the determination of general principles. Aquinas explains positive (which he calls Human) laws as being diversified due to the “great variety of human affairs” wherein “the common principles of natural law cannot be applied to all men in the same way.” Aquinas believes Human laws can be (or have been) derived from principled convictions (these stem from what he called Natural laws, of which the conscience has a basic understanding, and when that understanding is subconscious it manifests itself as a principled conviction) or from social norms (these describe normative, positivist law, which are not based on morality or Divine law, but are simply laws made for the purpose of regulating, structuring, and directing society with the purpose to give order and reduce chaos, and according to Aquinas, if Human law adequately points men to the realization of Natural law, it is beneficial in aiding man in the fulfillment of Divine law). Natural law include standards such as “one should not commit murder,” but says nothing as to necessary regulative laws such as how fast the speed limit should be, or what side of the road our society should drive on (therefore these laws are nothing but Human law). Furthermore, Aquinas believes that while there are many Human laws which are not natural laws, there are many Natural laws for which no Human law has been made (Feinberg/Coleman 10).
“[Laws] framed by man are either just or unjust. If they be just, they have the power of binding the conscience from the eternal law whence they are derived… On the other hand, laws may be unjust in two ways: first, by being contrary to human good… as when an authority imposes on his subjects burdensome laws, conducive, not to the common good, but rather to his own cupidity or vainglory… Secondly, laws may be unjust through being opposed to the divine good… Laws of this kind must in no way be observed, because… we ought to obey God rather than men” (Feinberg/Coleman 28).
There are certain guidelines Aquinas believes Positive laws (those binding in conscience) must be held in order to adhere to Natural laws. First, they must be ordered to the common good, with the intent (seemingly utilitarian in essence) toward the flourishing of some form of success (clarified again through Divine law). Second, the lawgiver must not exceed its authority. (The authority has been if overstepped if someone acts beyond their appointed authority; examples may include a Supreme Court Justice declaring war, a police officer granting pardons to death row inmates, or an E.M.T. conducting open heart surgery. More to Aquinas’ point, if the authority tries to overstep Divine law he has exceeded his authority – Divine law may include the commandments of the Old Testament, but I’m not sure what Aquinas’ stance on exactly what constitutes Divine law.) Third, the law’s burdens must be imposed on citizens fairly; the laws set up must apply to all its citizens equally. (The law is fallible if one race gets hung for an offense for which another race would merely be slapped on the wrist.) (Feinberg/Coleman 22-25).
“Law is nothing else than an ordinance of reason for the promotion of the common good, made by him who has the care of the community, and promulgated” (Feinberg/Coleman 2) .
The above statement is regarded as the final definition of law given by Aquinas. First, it contains the teleological ends of the “ordinance of reason”, meaning that it is given with a purpose, end, or goal. Secondly, he suggests a utilitarian theme of the common good, as previously reasoned. Third, promulgation suggests that the law must be made known by public declaration, saving society from guessing at every step what the law might be. Last, but not included in this quote, is Aquinas recognition of the “coercive power” for the “inducement to virtue” (Feinberg/Coleman 19-22, 31). (This implies the sanction of noncompliance.)
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John Austin presents the “Separation Thesis”, the “Command Theory”, and “Legal Sanction.” The Separation Thesis (defined earlier) starts with Jeremy Bentham, Austin’s predecessor, giving a descriptive analysis of law (with which he coined the term “expository jurisprudence”), “subjecting the law to moral criticism based on the principles of utility” (Feinberg/Coleman 33). The movement of Legal Positivism is thus pressed from a secular viewpoint of the causality and utility of law in opposition to the “vagueness and indeterminacy” embodied in morality (morals are beliefs, which in this case convictions rather than structured theories. As convictions these morals are based in feeling, which can not be determined to be right or wrong, nor based in utility, making them indeterminate as to their purpose, and validity. They are simply feelings, and without being empirically or logically sound structured theories they are vague). Austin, like Bentham, believed that in regards to the Separation Thesis, it is necessary to “separate the authentic subject matter of legal science from that which should be regarded as irrelevant to such a science (Tebbit 20). The Command Theory of Law embodies the idea that every law is a command. Those laws which do not lay down a rule from one rational being to another having power over him, those which do not have legal authority, or those which lack the power to back one’s sanctions, are not laws (Feinberg/Coleman 34-36). Sanction is “the evil which will probably be incurred in case a command be disobeyed”, whether it be forcing an undesired punishment by an authority (Punitive), or depriving a desired act from the capability of said authority (Privative) (Feinberg/Coleman 35).
Austin’s theory points out the difficulty in pinpointing a source of law without acknowledging a sovereign authority as the basis for all positive law (Feinberg/Coleman 4). Based on this difficulty, he goes on to describe the nature of sovereignty within the legal system. “For superiority is the power of enforcing compliance", and he who lays down the rule, with the power and will to enforce it is the sovereign. “Command and duty are, therefore, correlative terms… The greater the eventual evil, the greater [is] the strength of the obligation.” The importance of sovereignty to Austin lay not in the legal validity in accordance to some higher law, but in the realist sense of whether or not he has the ability and desire to enforce a sanction possessing a magnitude worthy of proper fear and compliance. The more drastic the threat, the greater the fear, and the more consistent the punitive or privative enforcement, the more consistent compliance will be.
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In disagreement, Aquinas doesn’t get a rebuttal to Austin, but then he was also trying to explain law from an entirely different perspective, beginning with his view of God and Divine law. Austin on the other hand tries to explain law from the perspective of a society trying to free itself from the legal tyranny begun by the perception of Aquinas’ God (while Austin does not clearly oppose Aquinas or his beliefs about God, he does hold that the perception of morality based on the unfounded beliefs of man, which have historically been influenced by the philosophy and theology of Aquinas, have found their way into the improper understanding and speaking of law, and legal theory, thus convoluting the proper advancement of legal and moral understanding). The specific, most important discrepancy between the two is that Aquinas believes in law within everything, not to be confused with morality, but definitely to include it. Aquinas believes in the laws of the universe, probably having something to do with mathematics and physics and their like. Aquinas believes in a law of nature, governing the natural order of life. He believes in the laws of God, upheld and handed down. Last, and definitively least, he believes there is a law of mankind, born of necessity to fulfill and perfect our fallible understanding of the laws of God and Nature.
Austin tries to explain God out of the mix of the legal profession, from fear of the implementation of a possibly corrupt tool in an idealized system which society must trust. In doing so, he points out that, “The existence of a law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another.” While the laws of God fit his most literal definition of law, they are not laws because they are “general commands laying down the moral requirements of utility.” Austin does indeed share beliefs about what laws are aimed at the “common good” and what aren’t, yet he seems to want to surpass the question of good and evil, and answer what it is, through extreme descriptive detail. Consequently, Austin’s command theory of law and his systematic analysis of the perception of law opened the door to the movement of legal realism, detracting the moral/value judgment, and simply defining what the law “is.” (Austin provided the bridge from the positivist view of the conception of law through methods which led legal realists to simply attempt to understand law even more objectively, acknowledging only what law is and how the system works, less focused on the initial need for law and how it parallels or contradicts morality.) While Austin would say that a corrupt law was legally valid if put in place and enforced, I think Austin would admit that it was indeed corrupt, but such does not negate from its validity. We are not held to law because it is right, but we are held to law because it holds us to it through sanction. A relevant statement is as follows:
“It could not follow from the fact that a rule violated standards of morality that it was not a rule of law; and conversely, it could not follow from the mere fact that a rule was morally desirable that it was a rule of law” (Hart).
That flies right in the face of Aquinas stance that morally desirable things are indeed those which are dictated by divine or natural law, and that morality must not be violated in order for a correlating law to be valid.
Both Austin and Aquinas seem to agree that laws have a form of sovereign as well as a sanction, and belief in validity (though what constitutes validity for each of them differs). Aquinas also has a stipulation within validity that seems to parallel Austin’s view; Aquinas says that even if a law is corrupt or invalid, it may be immoral, or one may be morally obligated to follow that law in respect to keeping an overall just legal system intact. Although it seems that Austin might object to this view, looking back on a statement he made about leaving room for radical reformation with regards to Christian moral principles shadowed in the guise of legal systems. I personally side with neither of these strong minds, yet I find value in both. I like Austin because I am most inclined to agree with a form of legal realism, and I believe Austin’s methods of attempting to clean up the language of law are consistent with the methods of analytical legal realism. I also like that as a positivist he tried to clarify and clean up the view of what constitutes law, acknowledging Aquinas different forms of law, but stating that having those views of laws confuses what law is in the legal field. I do think Aquinas made great progress in his own right, attempting to explain the different understandings of law as he saw them, whether held by Jewish tradition, that of The Church, and that of the courts.
In Aquinas’ favor I might prefer a judge that was more interested in my intentions and “goodness” than what the law dictates. This again would depend on what my “crime” was, since I may have acted corrupt under the presupposition that the law would rule in my immoral favor. Consistency is probably more important that morality to me. Predictability and strength of sanction enforce laws. Yet, moral parallels to the law may result in less chance of up-rise and power-shift. I believe there is a necessary connection between morality and law historically, if not causally, and yet I believe that law may indeed be understood, and perhaps should be understood amorally.
“A sacred and unalienable right is truly and indeed invaluable: For, seeing that it means nothing, there is nothing with which it can be measured.” (Aquinas, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, Lecture II)
The major difference in between Austin and Aquinas is validity of law, and the understanding of what law is. Aquinas believes (positive human) law is valid if it is intended toward the good, and focuses man to the understanding or fulfillment of Divine law (mandates of God laid down for man) through Natural (conscionable) law. He believes human law is a supplemental tool which aids in discerning Natural law. Natural law is mankind’s true law and anything in Human law that is immoral or incongruent with Natural law should not be understood to be law or valid law. Austin believes that only the laws of man should be understood as laws for they are what are true for men. He seems to believe that Aquinas’ Natural law is simply an understanding of Divine law, and that Divine law is a moral code set up by God, not a set of laws as law should be understood. Eternal laws like gravity and geometry are not laws at all, but the nature of, and/or forces within, our universe. Austin thinks law is only valid when it comes from one intelligent being (sovereign) implementing it on another intelligent being. The Sovereign must have the power and authority to enforce that law through sanction. His authority is granted by the acknowledgement of the people whom he rules, or dictated by laws created by a prior sovereign. When a law is not created by the sovereign, or the sovereign acts out of his authority, or when a command is given that is not paired with a sanction, the law mandated is invalid.
I agree more with Austin in the respect that the validity of law works within the system of law rather than with its relation to morality. I don’t believe that Austin’s Sovereign exists as he sees it in our society today. I do however agree that the power of the sanction and the consistency of its implementation upon actions incongruent with commands directly relate to the success of conformity to the desires results of the law. If we were fined every time we exceeded the speed limits, we would probably reduce our speed.
Reference Materials
Tebbit, Mark, Philosophy of Law: An Introduction, 2000, New York, NY. Taylor and Francis Books Ltd.
Feinberg, Joel and Coleman, Jules, Philosophy of Law -6th ed., 2000, Belmont, CA. Wadsworth/Thompson Learning.
Aquinas, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, Lecture II.