4/29/2006

Art: The Good, The Bad, and the Disqualified

Filed under: — site admin @ 7:38 pm
My aesthetic philosophy has been an incomplete, rugged confusion between reason and feelings up until now. Even after this first introduction to aesthetic judgment and taste, my philosophical stances have been vague. In my search for a good basis, I will take on the general aesthetical philosophies of two of the greats. Plato and Kant represent two philosophers born of opposite ends of the spectrum of perception and taste. I disagree with both of these views; Plato’s sense of the basis of reality surpasses reason and Kant’s aesthetics demand the impossible.
Plato belief of art is primarily based in his definition of the “Form” versus the particular manifestation of that form; something he would say participates in the form. Plato bases the truth of reality as something outside of the understanding of man, except for the properly educated and long lived philosopher, who can determine the indeterminable through reason rather than senses. Because Plato believes truth is something outside of that which we directly encounter, all art is in some sense an imitation. Whether an original representation or not, nothing is the real essence behind the idea or form in which it participates. I believe this is why Plato has such a negative view on imitation. He is very interested in creativity through originality, since he bashes those “arts” which are merely imitation of other art. Furthermore, he has a sort of moral judgment on art as being bad or good, based on either how good of an imitation it is, or the possible effects of a work of art on his hypothetical communal society.
Plato believes that the art of measurement, techne, is the basis for all other arts. For any artist to be able to judge art or start to compose art he must have some degree of understanding of measure, this can be learned or internal. Some have a better starting point of capabilities to discern composition, and technical beauties, but the education of such in the apt pupil is the highest starting point. Plato believes that the understanding of proper distribution, proportion, length, and perspective are the bases for principles of the beautiful, the good, and aesthetic taste (Hoftstadter-Kuhns 4, 7).
Plato believes there are ideas that the Demiurgos put into particulars through the first form of art, creation. Even those first artworks were imitations of the ideas which they represent. “All making is a kind of imitation; all that the gods or men may create is the re-presentation of a vision in a material medium” (H-K 5). Plato believes that many arts are merely external imitations, and for this reason, all arts which consist of some sort of imitation should be alert of the danger of imitators like Ion, who can imitate well, but understand nothing of the art as a whole. For this reason Plato believes that art should be judged and controlled by the statesman (or philosopher) so as not to confuse phantastike (false imitation) with eikastike (true imitation), thus corrupting society. The difference between what is fit and unfit (good and bad) art depends upon the moral ends of their presence in society (H-K 4, 9, 19, 37). .
Plato believes that imitative art can be inspired by the muse, which can inspire and overtake the artist with a sort of creative madness or passion. This madness can not be reduced to the purely technical side of art, and can far exceed the art of the solely technical. The technical art is the basis of art, but without the passion and expression it is not as good as it potentially could be. On the other hand, I believe, as I have no seen Plato face, a non-objective piece by Jackson Pollock (as seen here) would by a piece of work that is neither imitative nor technical (or contains very few qualities of measurement), yet is filled with passion or madness, would not be considered good or bad art. It would not be considered art at all. Plato says this madness is noble, and is far above ordinary knowledge. Of madness Plato says, “Rational intellect cannot reduce this to a rule, nor can the man who commands techne raise himself to the genuinely poetic without divine assistance” (H-K 53). This suggests that all inspiration comes from the divine, or the muse. Plato believes that this divine inspiration or madness is what “relates men to the gods and to the beauty of the eternal realm they inhabit” (H-K 60-61).
Plato’s philosophy, though not well constructed in one piece, contains enough inspirational insights to see his whole aesthetic philosophy in a general sense. Plato believes that art is an imitation of an imitation of an unattainable ideal truth of existence. This second string imitation is born and created from the knowledge of measurement and enhanced and given meaning through the madness of the divine. It can then be judged art or not (good imitation or bad imitation) from the knowledge of techne. However whether the art is good or not must be judged by the statesmen or philosopher kings as to its moral effects on society (H-K 66, 75-76).
Kant believes that in order to judge an object aesthetically, we must disinterestedly perceive the form of the representation, not merely the sensation of it, nor the emotions we relate to it, nor the mental constructs by which we associate or define the subject. Though the experience of the representation by the observer is subjective, the beauty of it is objective and identical in all men. Kant believes that art imitates nature, and does so necessarily because nature is beautiful. Kant believes in the artistic genius, similar to the concept of the Greek muse, except rather than the communication of the divine through the artist, it is the ability of man to produce imitations of nature for the purpose of judgment, fulfilling its purpose of such in beauty and taste.
The first and third movements of Kant’s aesthetic judgment answer to the question of whether something is aesthetic or not. These movements are of quality and relation. According to quality, Kant believes that the critic must be disinterested. In order to do this, according to relation, he must free himself at such a time from the faculties of the human mind: cognition, desire, and pleasure and pain. The conceptual, emotional, and sensuous must be totally separate from the judgment of the beautiful.
The second and fourth movements of Kant’s judgment of taste are movements of a priori. The second concerns the aspect of quantity and the fourth is of modality. According to quantity, the beauty must be universally and necessarily valid. As such it must be identical in all men. I see this as a relation to nature because in order for all men to view something as beautiful, it must be something related to instincts or nature of the species of man. Where other species or beings agree with us, there too must they be similar to us by nature. In such a case where one man views something as beautiful, it is only the case if every other man can, must, and must do no other than agree with such an assessment. According to modality, this must be distinct from the moral or theoretical judgment. It is only applicable in the present representation, and cannot be simply a general agreement which may be based on morals or theories. It must be true for all of them, as only knowledge can be true, and passed on, while the experience itself is ever-changing.
Kant describes genius as “the innate mental disposition through which nature gives the rule to art.” I understand this to imply that the genius is the faculty of the mind through which nature is perceived, filtered, and expressed. The genius is the filtration common in all rational beings; however, the mechanics of the artist’s ability to express such genius may not be so well endowed from one being to the next. Genius is a bit more in the sense that it actually develops the aesthetic idea in the imagination, giving at least some idea or state of mind perhaps with which the artist can express his aesthetic idea on canvas, marble or otherwise (Kant says, as I have noticed in my own art, that such an aesthetic idea “arouses much thought, but cannot be encompassed by any body of concepts”). I am unclear as to whether or not Kant believes genius includes the ability to produce the art which one conceives prior to the realization of the idea. However, I postulate it as being just the filtration in the mind because Kant remarks that “Through genius the real foundation of human nature speaks to human feeling.” If so, I believe the universally identical recognition of the truly beautiful lies in the genius filtering human nature thus exciting feelings of response when faced with beauty (H-K 279-280).
Kant defines a work of art as “the outward expression of aesthetic idea in the artist’s mind” (H-K 279-280). He refers here to the imaginative thought expressed later through genius. In such a case it fulfills purpose and aesthetic beauty, but does so apart from its utility, as he believes art is subject only to the judgment of beauty, thought the form of the art may entail some usefulness (architecture and music are examples he uses.)
I believe Plato’s arguments fail because in all other subjects besides the muse, reason reigns, and penetrates all truth. Only here do his beliefs about reason go astray and succumb to passion. More importantly, he believes everything is an imitation, and that all art is imitation and all art contains the art of measurement. However, non-objective art contains passion and some measurement, but it is without the imitation. In such, I am not convinced by his argument of what is art and is not art. Also, by what is good and bad, with regards to utility, I agree, but with regards to the moral judgment of what makes art good or bad, I disagree. Historically that may be said to be the case, as one civilization does away with another, yet calling dog a cat will not make it purr. I agree with some of Plato’s stances, that techne and measurement is important, but not all encompassing, and not the best of all possible arts. I also agree that imitation is a form of art, and yet not the best art, as it lacks originality in creativity, and may as well lack passion if it only imitates. However, there can be art that is a bad imitation, and as such becomes original creation. Furthermore, madness is not necessary for the artist, but it seems the greatest of the artists I’ve studied, and the one’s who put forth the most work, suffer this ailment often and gladly.
Kant, especially with my second bout with his aesthetics, is intriguing to say the least. With my first bout with his philosophy, I came away thinking his ideas were absurd and based in the impossible. I still believe that the method by which he believes we come to his accurate process and ends of judgment are still improbable enough to consider them unattainable in one’s lifetime. Yet, I think his whole theory is possibly true. The problem is that there is no clear way to prove that of the workings of genius, universal necessity in beauty and so forth. So, as Nietzsche says of the idols, the unattainable offers us no consolation, no redemption, and certainly can require no duty from us. And with regards to disinterestedly perceiving a subject of judgment, even if we had the duty here to act, how could we. I am not plausibly able to free myself from the conceptual, emotional, and the sensuous: the cognitive, desire, pleasure and pain. Also, Kant calls this his judgment of taste, but he says it must be made without the faculties of mind, which includes cognition. Of cognition, Kant says its faculties are understanding, reasoning, and judgment. He explained his “purposiveness without purpose”, but what of judgment without judging.
Even as a philosophy major and a 2-dimensional visual artist whose strength is drawing, I have not yet deciphered the minute differences between what may be called art and what may not be. Even through weighing these view points I have only reached the point where I recognize art as being something relative to the definition of the observer, granting that most observers have not sufficiently fleshed out their criteria for what can be art, not art, good art, or bad art. The first problem and probably the largest dispute I encounter in defining art lies in the idea that art is beautiful. By some definitions of that which is art, there can be no bad art; such an idea would be a fallacy, since it would simply not be art. However, I do not judge what art is, but what good art is. Even here I can not lump art into the categories of good and bad (I have faced this problem with my online critiques of what makes a good movie). Instead I choose to call myself, not a critic, but an appreciationist. I ask not if it is good or bad, but how good is it? In order to compare such a relative term as art, I must fight for and defend which qualities of art I believe can be compared, or at least whether their presence is valuable. I believe the major components behind the popular arguments for defining art can be divided between creativity, utility, passion, expression, form and composition.
According to Plato, “Things come into being either by art or by nature…” The rest of this quote includes spontaneity or luck, but as Darwin has lumped for us, those are methods of nature (and must obviously be so, if out of the control of the gods). Art is the other means of coming into being. I view this as meaning that which is not here by nature is here because it was created as art by some rational being; this could be a deity, mankind, or otherwise. If the sole definition of art is that which is created by rational beings, I believe as Plato would, that imitation must be bad art. Rather than being a creation, it is a re-creation of nature (which some have argued is the creation of God) or the creation of an imitation of the creation of another rational being. If I were to create a painting mirroring a self-portrait of Van Gogh, it may be an imitation, but is still a creation, therefore it is art (an example of creative art relative to subject matter on right). Calling something art at this point should not be confused with calling it beautiful or good, because he believes that imitation is bad art. Whether the painting itself is beautiful by proportions, color, line and other means of form, or even whether or not it shares fair likeness to the imitated is of no consequence to the fact that it is a creation, which is art, of an imitation, which is bad art (I am unclear if a bad imitation can be considered bad art because it does not imitate, yet I am certain Plato would put it worse on the scale, saying that not only is it bad art, but it is also a bad representation)
I believe that utility is an important part in art. Here I believe invention, one of the higher forms of art, encompasses creativity and utility. Function lies somewhere in the combination and distinction between expression and utility, as the function of a piece might be its message or expression. As such, a piece’s utility is how well it does what it was intended to do, or how well it serves any purpose becomes its utility with regards to history. For a piece of music, if it is written to praise God by lifting the spirits of the masses, then when this is played such should be the end result. It should not result in sadness and despondency in the masses. However, historically, the utility of this song might be great if it is good at creating despondency, it may later be used in warfare or mockery of an enemy. In many forms of art utility is a large part of the art, especially to music, poetry, invention, sculpture and architecture.
Passion, much like Plato’s madness, and much like his theory, is that which separates the greatest artists from the bland. I work frequently with an artist whose sole import is based in imitation, form, and composition. He thinks constantly of what a painting should look like to sell. But, his artwork, while very good, could be so much more if it contained utility, expression, or passion (an example of his work is on the right). Passion is what inspires the art, and often it is the inspiration that allows for hours and hours of detailed mundane work, or even the very few, but very precise and necessary placement of the strokes or lines, for the purpose of fulfilling this passion. Some works, based solely in passion, can be beautiful and inspiring; even though they lack form and composition (an example of this is my piece on the left).
Expression is commonly used to express emotion, but I believe that is less often intended, and should be thought of as passion. Expression I define as creating art to tell a story, or to convey some thought, opinion or emotion. Passion is when you lose hours, possibly days to the madness, and when you become aware of how much time has passed, you realize that you had been overtaken by something for a while, you get lost in your art. Expression on the other hand, is when art speaks intentionally. Religious art is almost always this way. Early tribal civilizations painted their history, their gods, and their great men. Churches later painted their theology, where angels glorified God, people lived in torment, and Jesus saved. An example of a work that tells a story, or has a story to be told within it is an older piece of mine here. This probably will not get printed in color, but this is titled “The Fall of Man.” There is an apple on the right, a DNA strand coming down the side, a serpent weaving around a human bone, the skull of a man, an empty crucifix on the left, with a heart carved at the center, the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil in the center of the page, surrounded by desert, and the top of the page contains the gates of heaven, and what are intended to be the fires of hell. While this picture does not actually show the story, it is an expression of the story, meant to be told when asked what the hell it is.
Form and composition are the most important elements, as Plato says of art. This is what allows someone to become an artist, as I previously pointed out, people with great passion can create good art, but great art requires some skill if he does not have, as Kant’s genius has, an innate sense of measurement. Form has much to do with the medium being used, having an understanding and proficiency in the tools of the trade. The sculptor must learn to use clay, bronze, stone, and marble. The Musician must learn an instrument, notes, and rhythm. The Painter must learn acrylics, oils, watercolors, the brushes, and the canvases. Now there are those who can pick something up and get down to it, but these folks are either rare or con men. Once one has the tools he must learn to use them. Composition is the study or art of making art, in a sense. There are theories behind what, as Kant believes exists, elements which man find pleasing (this was a hot topic in geometry, and has been for some time). With learning composition comes imitation. Before you learn to compose your own music, you learn to play others. With art, before you draw a boxing event, you learn to draw the human figure. For these reasons, Passion alone can end without much for which to show (an imitative composition of mine, above and to the right).
In studying Plato and other pro-philosophers (as opposed to the term anti-philosophers) I have desired to keep even my passions tied down to reason. I believe this is necessary, as form and composition are grounded in reason, but passion is not. Though my philosophy of aesthetics is far from complete, these two have shown me very different and very useful methods for discerning what is beautiful (Plato), and one can hope to judge such a thing (Kant).

Work Cited:
Hofstadter & Kuhns. Philosophies of Art and Beauty. Chicago, IL. 1964. The University of Chicago Press
http://www.ibiblio.org/wm/paint/auth/pollock/lavender-mist/pollock.lavender-mist.jpg
Untitled Sunflowers by Albert Valerio
Other art, titled but unimportant, by Chris Blight

4/26/2006

Taste Judgement

Filed under: — site admin @ 8:04 pm
Kant believes that when we judge an object aesthetically, we disinterestedly perceive the form (not the sensations of representations) of the subject (unlike the object which might be sensed, felt, or conceptualized). In order to judge beauty or taste, judgment and the subject’s beauty must be necessarily valid (distinct from the hypothetical) as well as valid and identical in all men (universal) (Hoftstadter-Kuhns 278-279).
Kant believes that art imitates nature, and does so necessarily because nature is beautiful. Kant believes in the artistic genius, similar to the concept of the Greek muse. His genius is “the innate mental disposition through which nature gives the rule to art.” I understand this to imply that the genius is the faculty of the mind through which nature is perceived, filtered, and expressed. The genius is the filtration common in all rational beings; however, the mechanics of the artist’s ability to express such genius may not be so well endowed from one being to the next. Genius is a bit more in the sense that it actually develops the aesthetic idea in the imagination, giving at least some idea or state of mind perhaps with which the artist can express his aesthetic idea on canvas, marble or otherwise (Kant says, as I have noticed in my own art, that such an aesthetic idea “arouses much thought, but cannot be encompassed by any body of concepts”). I am unclear as to whether or not Kant believes genius includes the ability to produce the art which one conceives prior to the realization of the idea. However, I postulate it as being just the filtration in the mind because Kant remarks that “Through genius the real foundation of human nature speaks to human feeling.” If so, I believe the universally identical recognition of the truly beautiful lies in the genius filtering human nature thus exciting feelings of response when faced with beauty. Kant defines a work of art as “the outward expression of aesthetic idea in the artist’s mind” (H-K 279-280).
For the artist to create aesthetically tasteful art, he must, as Kant says in the case of music, “both express and excite emotions, and at the same time be beautiful.” The goal of art is to express something in nature (an emotion, an object, or even a human ideal), as well as to arouse the desired and mutual emotion in the viewer. At the same time, in order to be viewed, and to be judged aesthetically, the art must be viewed as art (art in itself); only viewed as art can art be without purpose. In the case of realism (where art imitates nature directly as the purpose, rather than for the excitement of emotions as some methods of visual arts and/or music are concerned), Kant points out how “art can only be called beautiful if we are conscious of it as art while yet it looks like nature.” When art has the purpose to excite and/or express emotions, or to imitate nature physically or ideally, Kant says it has purposiveness, yet it is without purpose in so far as we judge it as art, without relation to anything else (utility or usefulness cannot be brought into aesthetical judgment) (H-K 279).
When we judge art, we must be perceive aesthetically rather than by the senses, we must not conceive of the object rationally, wherein we mentally disassemble and label the materials, disregarding art for art’s sake. We must judge the form rather than the representation of the form (the beauty behind the art it would seem), as the representations can be empirically objectified. The artwork must be judged solely based on how it affects the observer via pleasure or pain (not by which the subject matter of the representation is about a sad event which pains us, nor by the pain of a canvas staple cutting our fingers, nor by the pleasure that may be felt in the caressing marble goddesses). The type of pleasure or pain must be in “comparing the given representation in the subject with the whole faculty of representations, of which the mind is conscious in the feeling of its state.” In a painting of a lion, for instance, one must be impacted by the lion in comparison to all other representations of the form of a lion, and as well as the feeling not only by the lion as the subject, but as the proper response to such a subject (if it is a painting of a fearsome lion one must be conscious of the lion as fearsome from the painting, disinterested from the knowledge of lions as fearsome creatures, and indifferent to the case where one’s family was mercilessly slaughtered by lions in front of his eyes when he was young.) (H-K 281).
Kant defines beautiful artwork “in terms of purposiveness without a purpose,” the only form (as opposed to representation or sensation of such) which is the proper object of a judgment of taste. Kant states on utility of goodness, differentiating between good art and beautiful art, “That which pleases only as a means we call good for something.” A good table is one which serves well as a table in function with respect to other representations of the form of table. The one’s that bear weight and stay standing make good tables, the rest are not good, as it was built for this purpose. A good thing performs its function well, “but that which pleases for itself is good in itself.” In order to discover the good, one must know or have an idea of what the good ought to be. This suggests there is a will or desire to be satisfied in order for something to be found to be good, the satisfaction of the desire that something fulfills its intended purpose in the way it was intended to do so. Kant uses flowers as examples of those which have no meaning, no dependency on definite concepts (most people only have vague conceptions based on sensations of representations of flowers), and yet they please (he later equivocates that which pleases with that which is beautiful). Kant differentiates the good and the beautiful by saying that the goodness of something is weighed mediately or immediately of its usefulness in a relative situation, while that which pleases is always considered in the immediate sense, not to its nature, but to whether or not it is pleasing in verb tense (H-K 279, 283-284).
As to beauty and taste Kant says, “That which gratifies a man is called pleasant; that which merely pleases him is beautiful; that which is esteemed [or approved] by him, i.e. that to which he accords an objective worth, is good.” Again, Kant is not referring to pleasure or gratification of the senses, or of the rational, but relative to its disinterested and indifferent ability to evoke emotion through the expression of feeling of and in nature (which I can not help but get the inkling that this is in reference to man’s animal side, bound by the physical). Kant teaches a Hegelian message (though of course it was Hegel who adopted Kant) about the necessity of freedom, unfettering one’s self of the shackles of learned concepts and morals as well as the unreasoned and unnecessary desires of mind (and perhaps body) which enslave our judgment. Kant holds that taste is the faculty of judging an artwork by an entirely disinterested satisfaction or dissatisfaction, the object of such satisfaction, universal and apart from concepts, he calls beautiful (H-K 285-286).
Hofstadter & Kuhns. Philosophies of Art and Beauty. Chicago, IL. 1964. The University of Chicago Press

4/6/2006

Mind/Body: The Parasitic Connection

Filed under: — Eternal @ 8:39 am
Posted at http://www.huenemanniac.com/ under A Question

I think there is a parasitic relationship between us (the minds) and our host bodies. I would say that if we attempt to physically withdraw from our host bodies, we would cease to exist (die, or possibly transcend to a nirvana of enlightenment?) Which raises the question of astral projection, if it happens, does the mind leave the body or simply participate in “remote viewing"? I know I’m bringing in totally out there aspects of the question, but still…the parasite thing.

If we (minds again) choose to control the host body to the point of suffocation or ungodly (relatively speaking) temperatures or some other trampling of the bodies “rights” not only would we destroy the host bodies, but ourselves as well.
What is the body without parasitic infestation, a Terry Schiavo? At what point do we infest the host body? Are we new beings, needing the nurture of life through our hosts in order to develop? At what point does the parasitic mind come in contact with the host body.

On the other hand, is it the mind that is the beautiful thing, the naturally free being, which is somehow enslaved, as Mike seems to think, by some sort of parasitic host body -a body which binds and directs mental existence through physical needs?

No, you’re crazy (sorry a little bit of projection there).


Brain/Brawn: The Power to Change the World

Filed under: — Eternal @ 8:11 am
Posted at http://www.huenemanniac.com/ under Philosophy’s Responsibility?

I am sort of undecided about coercion vs action (not to make you civil people sound deceptive or forceful). However, I am decidedly against inaction, even if the action is merely to confront in dialogue, lectures, or debates.

At times violent overthrow may be successful, but probably more lasting, and closer to achieving Hegel’s dreamlike state/community, is the means of changing the system from within, or at least through the “proper channels”.

This style of revolution is discussed at least briefly in the film, “The Constant Gardener”, not to discuss their topic, but their disagreement on method. The chick (can i say that here?) is always quick to protest and revolt, not militantly but vocally. Ralph Fiennes’ character believes the only effective means for change in government/politics is through the respected channels. Later in the film she attempts to take physical action to promote change, and by the end, has convinced him to do so as well.

Personally, I think voting is probably the weakest tool above inaction. I even feel that unless one plans on running for positions himself, or backing someone in their campaign (with talent rather than pocketboot), not much can be achieved through proper channels. Protesting, while a form of action, seems a bit outdated, at least in the marching, cheering, and sign carrying aspect. However technology presents a platform through publications, the internet, television, and radio where one can reach a large amount of people and perhaps spur faster change by bypassing the “proper channels.”

For myself, I do not know if I believe in anything to the point that I want to do anything. I’m an unsung uberman growing comfortable in my wool, and I fear this is the threat of apathy, that the rebirth of the phoenix will be aborted and kept down by the man.

But…were I to find something I thought worth the fight, I’m not the type to “play the game”, and perhaps that’s why I’ll lose. Its my nature to fight where I need to and retreat within where I don’t. I’ve always felt I’m like Sin City’s Marv:

“He just had the rotten luck of being born in the wrong century. He’d be right at home on some ancient battlefield swinging an axe into somebody’s face. Or in a Roman arena, taking his sword to other gladiators like him. They woulda tossed him girls like Nancy back then.”

Thanks for the existential affirmation.

4/2/2006

Hegel’s Philosophy of Right

Filed under: — site admin @ 7:35 pm
I have found Hegel greatly difficult to grasp accurately. I fear that even if I were to read his works in full, I would merely grasp, as Hegel might put it, “an aggregate of information” on his thought, and still come up short as to the content and logical flow of his position on reality, perception, mind, and spirit (Kaufman 115). Peter Singer’s A Very Short Introduction on Hegel presents a direction and clarification of Hegelian thought that, while I may disagree with, I can at least understand. On the other hand, after reading excerpts of Hegel’s writings I feel that there is far too many possibly contradictory statements, but due to his prosaic writing I can not clearly understand his position, much less the validity of his arguments (also leading me to wonder as to the accuracy of Singer’s translation of Hegel’s views). This does not aid in my perception of Hegel and his thought, for it seems that if a man cannot make his position clear, he should not expect to be respected for his position, much less convince others to adopt his position (Singer 77).
Hegel speaks of an idea called Geist, which comes across as an amalgam of dharmic pantheism (within religions such as Hinduism, all things are a part of one supreme energy – Hinduism only directly requires this as qualities of the gods) and Plato’s “Form” (that behind every perceived conception, there exists the true form of such conception beyond our perception, merely played out, though only partially, by the particular experience). This geist (spirit or mind) is an all encompassing entity that is the goal of human history, through reason, as well as the transient essence behind every particular manifestation (of reason, I would assume). Despite this seemingly eastern twist on reality, he still maintains a western-based idea of state/community (thought not yet actualized as he deems fit for reason) ruled by the people, for the people, headed by a puppet monarchy, backed by parliament, and fully inspired, actualized and maintained by reason, and reason-based morality. This final state of “the state” is, as I understand him, the substantiation of the spirit into our world; this is the geist’s desire (don’t ask me why the geist gets to have desire rather than reason) to exist as a sort of heaven on earth, or an “absolute” freedom (Kaufman 119, Singer 57).
Hegel believes that each person begins as a “self” who becomes aware of self-consciousness through the acknowledgement of and by a conscious “other” being. At the point at which the mind conceives itself as a thing beyond the body, it attempts to prove itself as a being that is unattached to the material world. It attempts to show that it needs neither the “other” consciousness nor the “self” body to which his self understanding is attached. Animosity grows within the mind from this point, leading either to stoicism by retreating into itself, angry at the world, or through combat with the “other.” Facing the idea of combat, the winner lets the loser live, for fear that he may cease to be a self without the other and in so doing creates a master-slave connection. At this point the slave may become a stoic, presuming the master (and other) does not consider him a conscious being, thus negating his conception of self. This remains until one day the slave notices the effects of a conscious being imprinted within his physical working of the world, at which point he realizes he is a conscious being, with a sort of mirror of conscience as opposed to an “other” with which to reflect (Singer 78-81). In Philisophy of History and Philosophy of Right, Hegel goes on to show that the animosity between reason of the mind, and desires of nature are constantly combated in society and religion throughout history, and that those who promote desire aid in the confusion between the two (Singer 84).
The direction by which we come to comprehend Hegel’s geist, freedom, and community is first by the understanding of human history. His philosophy moves from that of history, seeing the actions and reactions of eras and societies (through contradiction and negation, and practical adaptation, just as the conscious self and other must progress) (Singer 29). Once we understand that man is progressing based on prior understanding, we can look back and presume that this is how man as an animal developed from minimal conscience to greater conscience, as each conscience proves to be less than knowledge, thus acting as a “determinate negation” leading to a new, more accurate form of conscience. Everyday, or at least every generation, we are becoming more and more conscious, not only of our societal conscience, but of the vast facets of our own consciousness (Phenomenology of the Mind; the mind’s perception of itself) (Singer 64). The closer the conscience comes to understanding itself, and to act through reason as opposed to desire (a process only attained by the emancipation of the chains of naturally and socially forced desires, through being made aware of the bonds, thus striving to abandon them), the closer the state (community rather than government, though it may include a form of government) will achieve this Hegelian freedom (with that he achieves a sort of utopia on earth, through Buddhist means of becoming desire less and purifying the mind).
Hegel echoes Kant’s perception that we can never truly perceive things accurately do to the constraints of our being. Hegel calls this unattainable (at least through sensory perception) knowledge “absolute.” Originally I would have guessed that Hegel believed, much like Plato, that the truest essence behind the particulars can be known through reason. Hegel seems to call such a task absurd and perhaps masturbatory (Kaufman 119). Instead he indicates that we must open ourselves like a vessel, consumed by awe, and edifying the geist by our actions through reason; however, not even attempting to understand the geist through reason, which would be impossible, but to experience it through feeling (Kaufman 118-119). It is at this point where I see Hegel’s praise of Christianity come to a head (at times he seems to praise it and at other times he seems to abhor it) (Singer 23-24, 84). Hegel believes that we are all a part of God, and that God is in everything, he disavows the person of God as Christianity understands him, and yet this geist does things he disavows like desires, or deserves edification and awe. I’ve yet to come to a clear conclusion on his belief about the Christian God and its relation to his pantheistic God in all of us.
“The great thing is to apprehend in the show of the temporal and the transient, the substance which is immanent and the eternal which is present” (I have put in the comma for my own understanding.) Hegel believes that the culmination of that which is in time, the physical manifestation of state on earth, and the culmination of spirit which transcends time, the substance (actualization of the geist) which is destined (through the progression of contradiction and negation, perfection is the end goal, which he believes will be reached “soon”), and the eternal (the heaven which we all strive for in some way; the conscious happiness) which underlies and envelopes all things, is the greatest thing to comprehend. In other words, it is a great thing to perceive and understand the participation of the geist in the physical, temporal world.
(Sorry for going on so long. I just wanted to make sure I covered the important topics of Hegel, and show my perception of what he believed in order to clarify my interpretation of his quote.)