12/13/2006

Who is God and Whose God is He?

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First Thoughts

The Traditional interpretation of the Christian God from the Bible does not need to be rejected any more than any other interpretation or belief. What may need to be revised is conduct of believers. There is a global search for the one true God, and it is true that a hard relativistic view cannot stand up to its own critique. But what I wonder is whether there is need for a God at all.

The two viable concepts of God mentioned thoroughly in, “God Under Fire”, are the biblical interpretations of God through open theism and “mainstream” Christianity. My challenge to open theists is that their theory makes God temporal, measurable, and within the grasp of science to behold. If so, where is the proof of the existence of God? How tall is He? Is it a “He” at all? To mainstream Christianity I challenge that the open theists have that the Bible speaks of a “human” or “changing” God. They must admit the fallibility of the Bible as it describes God, or at least that it is errant to the point that it can only describe man’s perception of God. The third, but less common view that I find viable is any perception of God solely through personal revelation. This theory has the major challenge that it must be an un-doubtable experience of sensation or illumination of further knowledge or understanding, without being simply an idea, burning inside, or a feeling. It must be clear. However, this fails to do any good for anyone other than he who perceives it; the experience is, or should be, only accessible and sufficient for he who “experiences God” directly. One cannot sufficiently communicate something “miraculous” to another (meaning supernatural and outside of nature, immeasurable and outside of science, illogical, irrational, or inconceivable with regards to the world as we know it – could anything else be miraculous?).

In “re-creating God,” open theists use the biblical God to promote their view of the “one true God” by reinterpreting scripture (The Bible) in a way more fitting to their view of God, much like the young earth creationists try to back Intelligent Design to support their specific version of God. The open theists’ God may fit better, but it is a different God, and their God was believed in as he is now, quite possibly before the books of the Bible were written. However, “the church” and theologians changed all that, and possibly the “who” of God in the process (once they got their hands on the text). I struggle with open theism from the perspective that if you are going to try to promote a view of God different from the mainstream, it should be offered as another viewpoint, not taking pieces here and there from the Bible, or even adopting the Bible as a whole. It is a powerful viewpoint, but one which creates its own faults in giving credence to the “text” which is a product of the “early Christian” and Catholic churches. Following, or allowing for the text to be true, or contain many truths –while it might provide a path to further one’s new “religion”- it ultimately becomes the largest reason for incompatibility and can easily be shunned as an abomination.

This is my view on the LDS church. With half a sentence they hope to free themselves from incompatibility with historic Christianity: “in so far as it [the Bible] is correctly translated.” Yet, while it brings many believers to its church through claiming the Bible and its message as their own, its ultimate downfall lies in the discrepancies between the description of God and the textual messages. (Although, left alone, I fear for the Mormons that, without the bible, there would be little historic, archeological, or geographic support for the events which occur in their texts.)

Once the Bible is called fallible and errant, it should be treated as such, not deified. I personally could only see open theism as valid on its own, as it seems to fly in the face of Biblical points on predestination and the description of God’s power and control. (Though I agree that the historic Christian theology does not fit piece by piece with the text either.) I believe there are varying levels of open theism, and I could see one as simply seeing mainstream interpretations as wrong, yet still holding to the text themselves. However, this refers to too much on free will, God’s power and control, and even his commands to inflict harm on one another as seen in Numbers 31:17 where he commands the killing of “little ones,” and 2 Kings 2:23-25 where it is implied that God sent two bears to maul 42 youths (see the added appendix for God’s other misdeeds). I think open theism’s main reason for existing is that people want another way to explain and permit free will, removing responsibility from an Omni benevolent God for that which we perceive as evil; the result is humanizing the creator in an attempt to feel more loved by that which we might not see, feel, hear, or know.

I certainly agree that God, “as we know him” must be reinvented, as he has historically been re-invented time and time again. The mainstream evangelical God, or even the mainstream “SLC Mormon” God of my generation are not compatible with the Biblical God, nor is the current Mormon God compatible with the God of Joseph Smith Jr..

Later Reflections

Talbot started poorly with a rather lame introduction (45-46) on how one asks questions, and how he comes by the answers to them. In fact, he beings quoting the Bible to back up his claims even before acknowledging the Bible as an adequate source for answering questions about the nature of God. This shows that either he made a mistake in his argument about how one can answer such questions, or he is not working from an argument, but an assumption about the Bible and God’s Nature.

I agree with Talbot that if there is a God, who has qualities such that man cannot bridge the gap of knowledge, then knowing God requires such a being to bridge that gap for us (45). I also agree with him that radical relativism and religious pluralism are mistaken viewpoints that cannot stand up to their own beliefs (as previously stated) (46-48).

Talbot points out how Christian theologians have “always” viewed scripture as the authority on Christian faith. However, while this might be true of theologians, it is obviously not true of Christians. Before the bile was compiled, the Jewish scriptures were held as authoritative, but many who believe in Christ (Jesus of Nazareth being God, the messiah) rejected the Jewish scriptures, or rejected the “authority” in them for the authority of Christ himself, even if accepting Him as the fulfillment of their scriptures. As far as the bible being established as the “scriptures” nobody held it as authoritative on Christianity between the “time of Christ” and the canonization of the bible (54).

I understand that if our only means to know Christ is through the bible, then to be Christian is to believe in the Christ of the bible. However, much of the bible’s stories have nothing or little to do with the life, and teachings of Christ. A controversial film known as “The Last Temptation of Christ” asked the question whether the “message” of Jesus was actually Jesus’ own. Could it have been Paul’s message? Paul certainly did a lot of writing in the New Testament preaching on how to be and how to conduct a church. From the tyranny of “the church(es)” it is easy to see why some would want to reject the authority of the Bible for simply its message of Christ (salvation), or life and teachings of Christ (how to live and how not to live). After all, is a Christian not defined as a “follower of Christ”? We need not pay the bible the respect due to a savior and/or God. Thus, to be any form of sect of Christian, one must believe in common grounds about Christ, not necessarily the authority of the bible. On the other hand, it is conceivable that one ought to believe in the bible’s historic authenticity if not just its message. Otherwise, why believe in Chris at all? Why not believe in majestic unicorns instead? For this reason of common belief in historic authenticity about Christ, I can see a possible line being drawn as to retaining the term Christian. So, I can definitely see Kleiner’s, and most mainstream Christian’s view that Mormons are not Christians. It is true that their Christ led a different, more Columbus like life, and stands in a much different light than that of the God he is purported to be in the bible. Thus, he should not have even been called Christ if he was going to be a different character with different attributes. Perhaps the character should have in fact been a majestic unicorn. I hate to sound like all the Christian “nay-sayers”, but if historical authenticity is important to believing in the person of Christ, The Book of Mormon has a lot to learn about authenticity.

Talbot goes on to say that the Bible is true because it says God says it is (55). This reminds me of the Aesop’s tale of the scorpion riding the back of some natural ecological animal opponent to save themselves from drowning. It ends with the scorpion stinging the creature that carried him, and they both drowned for it. The scorpion declared that it was in his nature. I for one believe that it is in the nature of those who promise to not be lying without first being openly doubted, that they probably are lying. It seems that the only people who do not openly see this biblical claim as ridiculous believe this way due to the taboo of blasphemy in light of peer pressure. Open theists and everyone else are right to question anything purported by man to be God’s doing, or “God inspired.” Not questioning is being conquered without a fight, and without even knowing who is beating you. If it is God, then great, but if you give in without knowing…

Pennock’s statement is right on the mark, that [if] God transmitted the bible through imperfect beings, we cannot know if God would do so in such a way as to “perfectly” survive those mediums (62). This is so even if the resultant text claims that it has happened in such a perfect way. The only resulting argument, “would God do that?” is inductive, guessing at His character. Pennock hits his target again pointing out how historically, “the unity of scriptures was assumed” (64).

Johnson basically reiterates most of what Sanders spoke of early on in “The God Who Risks” as far as the limits of communication, reasoning, and perception; both point out how these are stimulating ideas to freshman philosophers, but should not be feared for any practical purposes (though they should be recognized) (72-103).

On page 124 I didn’t understand the point of what Augustine of Hippo said about God and time, but since it quoted Psalms, I’ll assume it was just being poetic. Anselm points out a theory that if God is in all time, then he can be properly divided amongst every measured increment of time; such as, today we are experiencing .000001 over several trillionths of God, or some outrageous fraction. But, I think it could be seen in a light that because God is eternal, thus in all time, then his is 100 percent of God 100 percent of all time increments. This is kind of obscure. I enjoy the mental masturbation of discussing eternity, the infinite, and the non-temporal, but it is all meaningless. Not only can I not measure or experience eternity and its like, but I cannot fathom it. I can never finish the experience, for even when I’m “finished,” my experiencing of the infinite will not have attained the goal of completion…but perhaps the fun is in the journey, not in the destination.

Helm lists some strong quotes toward the argument of exhaustive knowledge and “planning” (Psalms 139:16) (1Chron. 28:9) (Heb. 4:13) (127). Of course, there may be a sort of double speak in the bible, not to be taken literally. Or perhaps the bible is simply men trying to conceive of God through their writing, doing the best they can. Maybe that is the nature of God. Craig also provides a wealth of biblical sources for divine foreknowledge followed by an unnecessary course in the logic of truth claims about future events.

Geivett gets into omnipotence, Omni benevolence, and the clash with the existence of evil (162-170). He compares them directly with theories of open theism. I was always taught that the way to understand Omni benevolence is not through our lenses of goodness, but as that defined by God, either by what he says is good, or by what he does as good. The existence of evil is due to God’s allowance, yet he is not to be blamed for it. First of all, there is none who can judge Him. Secondly, the existence of evil is what allows for free will and the ability to not be machines (a gift). Third is that man chose evil and so God granted man with the evil consequences of evil. Fourth is that while god is responsible for evil, he is not to be blamed for it because he has declared his plan to conquer evil (accepting responsibility) and saving us from it. (Who can blame someone who gave us free will and salvation?) The other discrepancy from the historic Christianity I was taught and open theism, as I have now learned it, is omniscience and exhaustive control versus free will and the idea of risk taking. Both of these I have thoroughly covered throughout this semester.

Afterword

Before last semester’s philosophy panel discussion on open theism, I had never heard of it, though I had heard of theistic evolution and process theology. While I disagree with either point of view, I now see them both just as plausible as one another. Though open theism better covers some questions as to difficult themes, I believe closed theism and open theism have many congruencies with the biblical nature of God that the other does not. Closed theists believe in an exhaustively powerful, all knowing God. Open theists believe in a God wholly apart from evil, who shows emotions like love and anger, changes in his relationship with man, and gives man a full and accurate libertarian free will (not just compatible with his plan).

NOTE: It has been a fun semester. Sorry that my papers lost some steam toward the end of the semester. I had too much on my plate to cover the topics as thoroughly as I had hoped. Remember to check How Many Has God Killed? I added for fun!

Evolution vs. Intelligent Design: Final Exam

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1. Materialism is the belief or idea that everything that can be said to exist matter and the physical interactions between matter. I believe Metaphysical Materialism is simply a viewpoint that materialism is correct, and that only materials (matter) exist, not just that only materials are the type of objects that can be said to exist. Usually either view suggests that within the realm of physical existence lays a causal deterministic quality, which can be measure by the calculated interactions between matters.
A couple of responses to this are that the causality could be presumed to be merely an assumption based simply from the perspective that, while parts can be measured, measuring, observing, and scientifically determining the characteristics of all interactions can never be attained, and so cannot adequately be determined to happen as one might calculate. This is sort of a Hume type of argument against causality, but it accurately proves that hard determinism remains theoretical on a large scale. The other response to this Metaphysical Materialism is that science cannot measure all things which are not matter, therefore, one cannot make the claim that only matter exists, and should not make the claim that only matter can exist.
2. Anthropic Coincidence is that the universe is “fine-tuned” for intelligent life. This means that the physical laws and constraints on the universe are necessary in order for intelligent life (life at all) to exist. The range of possible configurations of those constraints is so small, so as to suggest that it is highly unlikely to happen. Intelligent Design theorists believe that highly unlikely things happen necessarily by a determined outside force, especially given that Swinburne believes this is the first “shot” the universe has had at getting it right. The odds of such complexity coming to fruition suggest to them that it was intended (see Paley and his timepiece).
The first three examples in Barr’s book are the Strength of the Strong Nuclear Force, The Three Alpha Process, and the Stability of the Proton. These are all observations about the (our) universe, which are prerequisites for our existence. These are theories based on powerful evidence, theories that are often confused for, and may be understandably considered factual (that all computations are correct, since we cannot scientifically measure and observe the characteristics and results of other universes). The implication is that this universe seems to exist with a “purposiveness” to result in the existence of intelligent life. However, a criticism of this theory is that this is simply how the universe looks. It is always the case (is it not?) that things exist in environments in which it is possible for those things to exist. It is indeed unclear how the universe acts from start to finish, or the true nature or beginning of our universe, if not universes in general. We do not know whether or not our existence is natural or supernatural, random or intentional.
3. Creation is seen in a variety of lights, very few of which are compatible with the Big Bang theory. The largest, and perhaps loudest, viewpoint being spouted in America, by the Evangelical “literal interpretation” community, is that not only did Got create all things; he started from absolutely nothing (ex nihilo). The Big Bang requires the existence of many things: including physical laws, heat, atomic particles of elements, and more. However, the Big Bang theory does match up nicely with the philosophical theory of creation on the basis that it shows there was a “start” or beginning of sorts to the universe. This compatible view of creation is supported by its “purposiveness” presented by anthropic coincidences. Together, Intelligent Design is supported. The Evangelical community uses Intelligent Design as its spokesman in the modern world. However, what they miss is that two of the largest supporters of Intelligent Design are the Big Bang and Evolution. It seems clear that these two theories show high appearance of and support for Creation (Design at least) at both one point (the Big Bang) and through continual processes (Evolution). If creation happened, it is still happening in some sense.
4. Self Organization is defined as a “process in which the internal organization of a system increases in complexity without being guided or managed by an outside source.” This could be seen in one light to be contrary towards Darwin evolution which is perceived, perhaps incorrectly, as a theory by which things do not have fundamental properties which differentiate them, but are fully results of their environments and emerge or evolve only as a result of outside sources; it does not increase in complexity except through the guidance of process like natural selection. (Personally, I believe that these increases in complexity are complexly due to prior natural “outside forces.”)
5. Co-optation, though I do not specifically remember the term from the reading, relates to a method by which functionality evolves into new purposes. This is the differing concept disagreed upon by Miller and Behe in the discussion about Irreducible Complexity. Behe believes that there are no examples of numerous, successive slight modifications of a precursor system with regards to the eubacterial flagellum, thus proving that it is an irreducibly complex machine, which itself could not have come about through evolution, but must have been Intelligently Designed. Miller believes that the Type Three Secretory System (TTSS) is homologous to the E. Coli bacterial flagellum; the molecular machines consisting of a combination of proteins is a reducible, successive, slight modification, and functional precursor system between both the flagellum of one and the secretory system of the other. Behe’s colleagues in the I.D. community respond by claiming that now there are two examples of irreducible complexity, rather than showing that the one which contains the other has been shown to be reducible (if they are that slow, perhaps their need for God uncommonly high). I personally do not see how evolution must contain functional (at least with regards to the same purpose) precursors in order to become more complex. I believe co-optation can include happenstance circumstances which occur through mutation, or in response to some other environment, than the one for which it evolves to further complexity. Specifically (perhaps similar to anthropic coincidences), say that a creature has harder scales than the current environment it lives in necessitates for survival. When something changes that environment, the purpose of the skin and its hardness may change according to its new set of circumstances (protects against thorns rather than simply enclosing the circulatory and muscular system.) As referenced in an encyclopedia, an instance may be when “bones supporting the gill arches of a jawless fish allegedly adapted to support the lower jaw of reptiles, and later become the tiny hammer, anvil, and stirrup of the mammalian middle ear.” But I further that theory by saying that there are parts which have a purpose which may not be obvious, necessary, or beneficial for the organism, but which may later turn out to be the foundations for a more complex feature.
6. Theistic Evolution, as stated above and more in depth in my paper on the book, “God Under Fire,” is congruent with Intelligent Design, in that the gaps or punctuations which are unexplained by evolutionary science, may be explained by God’s helping things along. This is very congruent with both the purposiveness in functional evolution toward complexity, and process providence (God working with creation, and creating as he goes, sharing in a relationship with his creation throughout). I believe that Theistic Evolution fits great with Intelligent Design, however not all those who believe in I.D. believe in Theistic Evolution. Theistic Evolution usually backs theories such as the Big Bang, not so insistent on God creating everything and being in exhaustive control, but taking what there was to work with, perhaps giving them laws, and perhaps putting them into motion toward an ultimate purpose. Then, continuing creation through the process he designed, which we call evolution.
7. Meyer argues that the Cambrian Explosion, a significant rapid increase in the prevalence of varying life and complexity (information) long, long ago, is evidence that evolution is not causally adequate to explain. This is an evidence of purposiveness if not Intelligent Design. During the explosion, Meyer believes that there was far more than explainable information built into the new proteins, cell types, and body plans. That the jump in such a short period of time is in a way “irreducibly complex”, such that big leaps had to be made genetically before new organisms could achieve such a high complexity. I think this theory makes perfect sense…I just do not buy it. I agree that we do not have enough information to understand or explain the Cambrian Explosion, but I also do not have the need to have it explained. For all I know, it is in the nature of some types of organisms or even in some stages of genetic mutations that they divide, replicate, vary, and change at an alarming rate. Perhaps whatever it is that mutated into such information complexity, contained attributes homologous to stem cells. Who knows?

Biomedical Ethics Final Exam

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1. In short, utility theory, or utilitarianism seeks to maximize utility, stating that rightness is defined as that which provides the most utility. The action or rule that causes the greatest benefit, goodness, happiness, or pleasure (utility) to the greatest number of people is the most right. The problem with this theory is that it is the basis for ideas such that it is right to kill a Hitler so that millions may live. Or, that if 200 people would die on a train if not destroyed, it (in specific circumstances) derails, hits a building, and results in 201 deaths. Utility theory says to take out the 200 for the sake of the 201 lives. Another criticism in relation to the health care field is that utility theory tries to provide the best care for the most amounts of people, but hospital care, medications, cat scans and such cost money. And from a capitalistic societal viewpoint, the more money you have, the better health care can be made available. So, what it comes down to is providing the best minimum health care for the most amounts of people who cannot afford it. ( I could go into Mill, Bentham, Kant, and Act vs. Rule, but that would take too long.)
2. Consumer Bill of Rights and Responsibility states that, “Consumers have the right to communicate with health care providers in confidence and to have the confidentiality of their individually identifiable health care information protected.” These rights are in place in order to provide the best care for the patient, which requires specific information about him. However, for insurance, personal, and discriminatory reasons, people have the society-established right to privacy. However, there is a problem with this theory for physicians, mental health care-providers, and priests. The problem is presented when a confession is made about plans to harm or kill another person. In the medical field, when a person with HIV (704-705) makes it clear that they plan to continue having unprotected sex with an individual without informing them of the risk and disease, the physician may feel torn by where his responsibilities lie. This has now been considered attempted murder in some courts, and the argument has been made that people in certain positions of confidentiality are required by law to divulge information they have about the plans to commit a future crime. In some cases it has been argued that calling the police is not enough, but that the duty lies in contacting the intended victim. I would consider a person who did not inform proper authorities about the planning of a crime an accessory to the crime. However, I believe the authorities should then have the responsibility to contact the intended victim.
3. The Oregon assisted suicide law is a great advancement to the diversity of thought and lifestyle in our country. However, for proponents of assisted suicide, it is far too limiting. Many people are in devastating health conditions which will allow them to remain stable, but in horrible health and tremendous pain, but live far longer than six months. More importantly many illnesses that result in the loss of “person hood” or memory and brain function, but cause pain, are not considered terminal illnesses, and are also not covered as qualifying for legal assisted suicide. For this last type to be considered, the doctors must consider them in “decision-making capacity”, not emotionally based, and not brain damaged in some sense.
4. I was unable to find in our book, and could not remember reading from it about a “mad scientist.” But, I did discover much or Judith Jarvis Thomson’s essay was omitted from our book. I think I can speak sufficiently on the issue from the “violinist” example, but I did find this in my research:
“Distinguish between Tim and Tim*: one and the same person whom we imagine in two altogether different situations. Tim’s situation is normal, like yours or mine. Tim*, however, is a brain in a vat. Suppose a mad scientist abducted and “envatted” Tim* by removing his brain from his skull and putting it in a vat in which his brain is kept alive. Next, the mad scientist connects the nerve endings of Tim*’s brain with wires to a machine that, controlled by a powerful computer, starts stimulating Tim*’s brain in such a way that Tim* does not notice what actually happened to him. He is going to have perfectly ordinary experiences, just like Tim. Indeed, let’s assume that the mental states of Tim and the mental states of Tim* are alike. But, since Tim* is a brain in a vat, he is, unlike Tim, radically deceived about his actual situation. For example, when Tim believes he has hands, he is right. When Tim* believes he has hands, he is mistaken. (His hands were discarded, along with the rest of his limbs and torso.) When Tim believes he is drinking coffee, he is right. When Tim* believes he is drinking coffee, he is mistaken. (Brains don’t drink coffee.) Now suppose Tim* asks himself whether he is justified in believing that he has hands. Since Tim* is just like Tim, Tim* will say that his belief is justified, just as Tim would if he were to ask himself whether he is justified in believing that he has hands. Evidentialism implies that Tim*’s answer is correct. For even though he is deceived about his external situation, he is not deceived about his evidence: the way things appear to him in his experiences. This illustrates the internality of evidentialist justification. Reliabilism, on the other hand, suggests that Tim*’s answer is incorrect. Tim*’s belief that he has hands originates in cognitive processes — “seeing” and “feeling” his (nonexisting) hands — that now yield virtually no true beliefs. To the extent that this implies their unreliability, the resulting beliefs are unjustified. Consequently, he is deceived not only about his external situation (his not having hands), but also about the justificational status of his belief that he has hands. This illustrates the externality of reliabilist justification.” (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/)

If this is the situation I was supposed to read, one dealing with a sort of epistemic relativism, it relates to the “violinist” with regards to justification from perspectives of both the mother and fetus. It brings to question, and yet shows how both can have rights which seem to come into conflict.
To stick mainly to the “violinist” example, Thomson points out that both entities have rights, personhood aside. It is not a question, in her mind, about whether or not a fetus has the right to life. The question of the analogy should be aimed at whether or not the fetus has the right to a woman’s body. The violinist example is excellent philosophical work, in that it sticks to tradition by throwing out crazy examples that are both laughable, and very serious. It goes to show that one should not be expected to do something he has the right not to do (the morality of this thought is explained more in depth in her minimally good Samaritan versus the good Samaritan). Whether or not I would be willing to remain attached to a violinist is not the issue, what is pertinent is whether or not I should have to do so. I think this way of thinking blows the “right to lifers” right out of the water. Because the most important line Thomson gives is that, “the right to life consists not in the right not to be killed, but rather in the right not to be killed unjustly…you do not act unjustly toward him in unplugging yourself, thereby killing him…if you do not kill him unjustly, you do not violate his right to life, and so it is no wonder you do him no injustice.” Somewhat similar to the mad scientist story above, both rights seem to imply conflict, but a further understanding of what those rights consist shows that they are not in conflict. It is simply a pity that someone has to die, though not unjustly, but that he perhaps could have been saved by a good Samaritan.
My personal criticism of this theory is that, while it shows that a woman has the right not to have a baby when she has not willfully engaged in an act that would result in such an expected outcome, and has the right toward self-defense and probably utility in a case where having a baby might threaten her life, it does not point to the fact that abortion most commonly occurs for the purpose of convenience. Her defense is only to that of the two most extreme cases, which are the two most agreed upon cases toward the pro-choice point of view. Her argument does bode well for those who believe the question is not in the personhood or rights of a fetus, but it does not distinguish from those “pro-abortionists” who lack her reasoning, and her portrayed circumstances.
5. Mary Anne Warren argues that a fetus is not a person (451). She believes that because a fetus shares no resemblance to a human, it has no right to life. Not only are they not persons visually, but they are not “moral persons” for the reason that they do not share in the type of thoughts, activities and lifestyles that adult humans do. She believes in the second part about newborns in addition to fetuses. The problems with her theory are obvious. If you deny the “humanity” of anything for the sake of destroying it, especially something that is biologically human, the determining point at which to draw “moral” lines on mass destruction of life is significantly blurred. Through her version of reasonability toward abortion status, she paves the way for the justification of infanticide. Once you standardize and legalize killing babies, what’s next…toddlers then children? It makes for a poor policy. My question for her is what “moral” person justifies unnecessary, but convenient, destruction of life?
6. An age based rationing policy is difficult to construct fairly. Most of the available funds or care would be necessary for people middle aged through elderly. The more quality care the elderly patients are given, the longer they go on living, thus soaking up more available funds. However, it does seem like a necessary procedure, that the generation that raised us should be supported by us in their passing years. The problem with this policy is that while most of the money and care necessary would go to those most “in need,” they are not necessarily the people who can be most helped by the care. It becomes unfair to a variety of people, no matter where the age divisions are made, because all types of illnesses and injuries occur to almost all types of people. The theory that challenges this age based rationing is one of utility, one based on quality of expected life. For this purpose, those with the smallest benefit from expensive care would be least prioritized for treatment. This allows for less necessity for an assisted suicide policy; it allows people who may not want to continue on living from being given the care to extend their living anyway. It gives children who may develop cancer the care to possibly fight it and live on for another 50-70 years. I believe that in general this sounds like a great policy of rationing, but in practical application, it may be very difficult to establish the limits based on voters and family wage earners.
7. Letting the private marketplace solve the healthcare access problem by using insurance vouchers seems to be somewhat promising. It increases competition in the medical field, but allows patients to choose their physicians, choose what type of medical care to receive and to cover with those vouchers, and save on base premiums toward unnecessary care. It seems to allow people more freedom all around, being smarter with their health care, and probably smarter with how they take care of themselves. The way things are currently run make cost health insurance far to costly, and to save money for themselves, the companies choose what physicians, procedures, and brand name medications to use. This would put the power and the profits back into the hands of the consumers. I believe that having this simply as a base tool to ensure all people to have health insurance (first by making it affordable, then by making it mandatory, and refundable at tax time) is a great step, but needs to allow those who want or need far higher care to buy full coverage and pay their premiums.
8. Single-payer health care systems, like Canada’s, prove to be quite beneficial in covering most of the needs of most of the people. The problem which ill and rich Canadians, and Americans, usually have with Canada’s single-payer health care system is that it has limits on technology and expense. Many people, from here, fear the idea that when they go to receive their healthcare, the necessary procedures or equipment will not be available, but this can be solved quite easily if it is not already.
My theory is that we should have an amalgam of the two types of health insurance. We could have a government run single-payer basic health care system for physician checkups, physical injury (job related injuries would have to be covered by the employer, unless negligence was shown on the part of the employee…then he’s on his own, perhaps to use his vouchers), limited ambulatory care, limited drug prescription needs, and limited pregnancy / birthing care. On top of that we would have to limit profiteering. For high costs of hospital stays, further testing (biopsies and such), cancer treatment, and high tech medical advances, insurance is optional, or one would have the availability to pay for such care himself when necessary. If very few hospitals or medical care facilities had the high end equipment, they would get all the business. India and some other Asian countries equal advances and availability to the U.S. as far as being unlimited in care quality. However, people have to fly or travel long distances to get to these places, but they are considered the luxury in health care facilities. The costs are probably only affordable by the “top one percent,” but it is available to those who are willing and able to pay.

Death with Dignity and the Respect for Autonomy

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Euthanasia is a highly controversial subject, primarily for the reason that people believe life to be sacred, and that everything which can be done to keep a person alive should be done. There are limits of course. Most of these people that believe respirators and other methods of life preserving are great tools. Cryogenic freezing, however, is something totally unheard of by the public as a tool to preserve life. Although it seems an odd argument or a stretch, it is the extreme (though perhaps a hypothetical extreme) which I think by the refusal of such a proposition by these life-preservationists proves that survival and the preservation of life at all costs is unnatural, if not also inhumane.
Patient, and person, autonomy is the most basic and necessary respect for successful societal living. However, autonomy is only worth the information from which decisions are being made. Summarily, with regards to scenario number three in our euthanasia packet, while patient autonomy should be respected, it is also the doctor’s duty to act within what he sees as the best interest of the patient, as well as the best interest of the patient’s caretakers. In this scenario, the doctor believed that the decision made by the parents was uninformed (or incorrect), and so acted in what he thought was the best interest of the patient and caretakers, until he could inform them of what he believed was the real cause of the seizures. It is unclear if he had planned to discuss his view with the parents, but I believe that if he had planned to, he did his job, and did it correctly. Even if his theory had turned out to be wrong, as a doctor, he should attempt to preserve life, because they can always let the child die tomorrow or next week, if he was wrong and the parents still want the advanced life support removed.
With regards to “Death Doctors”, I agree that those we rely on for aid, wellness, and life-preservation may not be best suited (by their societal role) for the job of assisted suicide. However, I believe assisted suicide should be made legally available, and may be most responsibly done if conducted by a trained medical doctor. In which case, this doctor’s profession should be in the business of death dealing only, so as not to confuse the roles between the caretakers and life-relievers.
As far as autonomy and assisted suicide go, it is a big deal to ask someone to kill you. Whether to ask a complete stranger, or your closest friend or family member, this is a huge request for most people. I have not yet decided whether it is unethical to request such a thing or not, but I have asked it from my brother for possible future necessity. I believe that people have the privilege to pursue the type of life they wish to live, and as dying is not only a limit on life but a process of life, free people should be permitted to choose how they wish to pass on. Of course, this is most commonly done only by those who are mentally (emotionally) unstable, which is perhaps the second largest reason that suicide is treated as abominable (the first being that people hold life to be sacred to the point that more is equal to better). I personally have made the decision to take my own life (in approximately 42 years –do not worry) because in knowing that I have no control on whether or not I die, I would like to have some say in how I die. I cannot know how the future will turn out, but I can have a plan “A” or “B” and see what happens.
I have requested of my brother, as I know the rest of my family could not fathom such an act, that he be my second in the ritual of samurai seppuku. If I have a say in when I go, I plan to disembowel myself with my tanto (the smallest in the set of samurai swords: katana for attack, wakasashi for defense, and tanto for seppuku), and the job of my second will be to behead me with my katana as I lean forward on my knees, to ensure that I go cleanly. I then plan to have adequate funds to pay for a Viking Burial. My corpse (head and body) should be placed in a small wooden boat (most likely built by myself and a carpenter friend of mine). Four of my friends have already been requested to fire flaming arrows from their bows at my boat, once cast off (in what body of water I have not yet decided). I do not mind if accelerant is used to quicken the burning, and increase the success of igniting the boat. There will be no ashes to keep afterward, but whomever is my second in seppuku may keep my katana to remember me by, if they so choose. I know this may seem odd to people, but if I have to die, I should be able, and plan to do so in a way I find interesting and desirable (My reasons for desiring these two aspects are an interesting story, but do not belong here).
To sum up this brief discussion of the aspects of Euthanasia, I believe the kind most feared by the world is obviously disagreeable. That kind is the assisted killing of the unwilling, or as Hitler’s regime is reported to have conducted, killing people who are sick or old, for the purpose of cleansing the living and increasing their quality of life without having to support the less able. I believe that most forms of passive Euthanasia are inhumane, slow, and painful. I believe in active euthanasia, but for the sake of those whose assistance might be requested, the assistance should probably be made less direct, such as the allowance of some sort of morphine button; with a pain killer, that when overdosed, brings about death in a seemingly peaceful manner. Even with seppuku, the disemboweling is done to cause death. At which point beheading is merely an aid by which the pain is ended, and relief is given by allowing the patient to pass on more quickly. It is easier for the second to do his job, when it is clear that the other will die either way.

12/5/2006

Debating Design

Filed under: — site admin @ 8:57 pm
I began this paper with the intent of discussing the issues in a reactionary way toward the opinions of the authors of Debating Design and following it up with a meat of the argument description of my own views on the subject. However, given my expression of my major opinions in my first paper on Barr’s book, and the depth of which my reactions to this book have led, I have decided merely to respond to issues as I found them interesting throughout my reading.
Intelligent Design (ID) in the classroom is a topic of much debate. I do not believe it has any place in “science” class. It is often merely an argument to complexity, which is then interpreted as an ID argument. The major problem with this argument is that it is inductive reasoning, used underhandedly to promote a pre existing theory, rather than to establish new “truths” through reason. The theory of ID is usually religiously (not scientifically) based and promoted and therefore is inapplicable in the science classroom.
I do indeed agree that there is a sort of tyranny that goes on in the scientific community. There has historically and currently been obvious political discrimination against religions, effectively oppressing them before they oppress the rest of us (again). The scandalous scientific community disavows any scientific theories the religious may have, in hopes to adopt a theory not of control or providence, but of progression (which evolution so conveniently offers). This is a shame, but the religious empires did earn it, for this may be a necessary shame since creationists adopt intelligent design as their own theory, provided it not stop before teaching their God and his salvation plan. Whether ID is creationism, or whether or not it originated from creationism, it has become their tool, their wedge.
Scientifically based rebuttals to Darwinism should have a place in the teaching of evolution, but only when evolution is the class, not a small, or even big, piece of a biology class. Evolution or Darwinian evolution / Darwinism should not be discussed or taught as facts, but as the going theory. However, the observable phenomena upon which the theories are based should be recognized as factual claims of observation. For example: “This is what we see happening…” is a fact; “This is what we think it means…” is a theory.
Miller gives a nice rebuttal to Dembski and Behe on rhetoric and assumptions often found by creationists (90-91). Sober, on the other hand, describes a sort of logic of probability which is ridiculous, and does not even begin with premises which I and other evolutionists would agree. He uses terms in phrases such as “Mindless chance processes,” which I have already shown great turmoil with in my paper on Barr.
After getting through Sober, it seems to me that Hume was inadequately represented. I will not try to do better, because I have not read any of Hume’s applicable work on the subject of Design. However, something that came to mind is that Sober says that Hume shows that the likelihood argument gives no information on the attributes of the designer (107). This is extremely important when tied with a later argument. This one is that people look at nature (that studied by biology, physics, chemistry and geology for example) and try to decide if it would take an intelligence to design them, if they are indeed designed. When comparing, this is done either through teleological or complexity arguments. While neither necessarily entails a designer, by relating created objects of man to their teleological purposes, or complexity in function and form, we can see similarities. The problem here is that the intelligence we may think we see in the characteristics or functions of objects is intelligent (so we think) because it is like, in some ways, to things man would create. To believe that this entails a designer is deceptive because it may only be that man makes stuff like nature, or may mean that things are like other things; all things are more closely related than they man seem, through their physical makeup and forces of action. It may simply show that all things work within natural or physical paths, and given enough travelers, the paths will be used often, and by many things. To the point, we cannot know what kind of things represent design by a designer. We cannot know this because all we can know about this hypothetical designer is that he is very different from us. Specifically, if “designer(s)” created all things, or organized life processes, they have abilities very unlike ours. Since something that could do this would be very different from us. We cannot know what to look for as a sign of ID. This is where Hume’s point was pertinent. Even if the likelihood argument had merit in pointing to ID, it shows nothing about the designer. And, if we do not know about the designer or how it works, and what ID from that designer would look like, the question is moot. There is, then, no evidence to design, because the intelligence we see is “mankind’s ” intelligence; we have never seen a man responsible for life and evolution. It would seem to me that thought some might not buy into this argument, we really cannot know what to look for, and will not know even if we find evidences of ID, without some special knowledge and reason of a designer to give us some understanding.
Another point made by sober on ID is that it is not science or scientific, partly because it makes no predictions and is not a testable hypothesis (114). I thought Sober’s anthropic arguments were a good addition to Barr’s, although I disagree with the premises used by each of them.
I agree with Pennock that many of the creationists fear evolution for unfounded reasons. They reject science yet grasp at any “wedge” arguments that attempt to give scientific grounds for intelligent designer or debunking any evolutionary theories (138). I found Pennock’s points against Young Earth Creationists (YEC) extremely poignant. That argument being that the largest “debunking” argument against (gradual) evolution includes its inherent inability to explain the Cambrian Explosion, YEC, however, cannot even start from this premise because they reject the dating methods which account for the Cambrian era (132) Pennock concludes that methodological materialism is neutral with regard to the God hypothesis, and human rights are not in jeopardy based on the existing theory of evolution, and that while the ID wedge-movement is a protected religious right, it has no place in the classroom (145).
Kauffman was an interesting read on biology and including the point that to study ID in science, we are not just letting the religious folk in the door, but also the extra-terrestrial groups, who have just as much right, if not more right to speak their piece. Beyond these points, I did not see a need for Kauffman’s work in this book.
Behe’s argument is simple and obviously errant. The problem with his first point is that natural selection does not always work through adaptation. It works also through mutations, and through the survival of traits which may not be necessary, but which do ot necessarily aid or hinder reproductive success. The other problem with his first point is that natural selection is not always gradual, linear, and/or sequential. Many traits are constantly shuffling throughout the gene pool, many environments are constantly challenging the same species, and many times there are large jumps, (not gradual) made through small mutation, or through processes which appear punctuated. Drastic changes in environment may require that any who live, either already be prepared for change, or happen to change quickly (speaking amongst more than one generation). When one member (or group, or group of several generations) of the species is able to quickly adapt, the processes can be a leap with a butterfly effect on its decedents. Behe is wrong on his first point because he confuses natural selection as the whole of evolutionary biology. Natural selection can be both gradual and punctuated (having larger jumps than others), linear and web-like (different environments confronting the same species at the same time or at different times), sequential and random (through natural selection or mutation). On his second point, the gradual, linear and sequential adaptation form of natural selection may indeed account for molecular functional complexity, though I would be hard pressed to show how. It is my belief that these complexities exist by their nature, not by their design, and as Depew points out, Behe tried to lose the crowd in his rhetoric of being left with only one option (175).
While Paul Davies’ “Arrow of time” section was very interesting and fun to read, I think Barr put the theories of the universe into a simpler and better (clearer) perspective. I interpret this as: it is fun to study the universe, and may or may not (ever) prove all that useful. We see but the smallest fragment of the time and space of our universe, and the chances pretty much guarantee that not only mankind, but life on earth, will cease to exist with the blink of a universe’s eye. Effectively, the fate of the universe (from as small a sample size as I can experience) is not only unknowable to me, but even when its nature is assumed cannot persuade me on how I ought to live. If entropy is the fate of the universe, and there is only trillions (+) years left for it to remain, I still probably will be unable to make it to the age of seventy-five years.
Barham states a theory that “organisms behave according to a functional logic”: A is preferred; B is necessary for A; therefore, B is chosen (212). He goes on to say that this means organisms are not propelled by causes, but for reasons. To say that one thing acting towards a preferred end is not causal but by reason is to forget to ask how or why the preference exists. To say that “All function conforms to this pattern” is merely to describe function, and in doing so admitting to the idea that organisms are machines. They are cogs in causal patterns of function, unable to act outside of this paradigm, or so Barham’s claim would unintentionally seem to entail. I, however, from a causal standpoint, believe that there are causes behind the nature, description, and preferences present in all organisms. That A is the desire of the organism by nature (default – descriptive of its current state, even if made so by other causes), and that B is necessary for A to be achieved; from an evolutionary point of view, the machine adapts because only those which happen to fulfill B, achieve A, and the gene pool of the next generation are more likely to fulfill B, until it almost becomes a preference to achieve B, even when it becomes the case that B is no longer necessary to achieve A.
Though I disagree with Barham, on a few points, his ideas on semantic information (214) and energy minimization (216-222) are very informative and interesting. I’m not sure that I agree with his theory that living mechanisms maximize energy toward sustenance, while mere chemical and nonliving entities (rocks) minimize energy toward sustenance. However, if his theory is correct, it may be a decent angle from which to fire his magic bullet at the anti-Design empire.
With Haught, there is very little I disagree with, however, although I do not “disagree” with his points, I also do not agree with them. That is to say, his theories on providence and non-materialism are possible and plausible, yet I think he simply chooses to believe this, not because the nature or direction of science, but because it is either convenient to his beliefs, or compatible to his own experience. While Darwinian evolution (244) does not necessitate the existence of materialism (I’m not sure if he means causality/ hard determinism as well as I), I believe that the truth or existence of deterministic causality in the material world is as evident, if not more so, than Darwinian evolution; both of which are merely descriptive observations of the world in action. I do want to point out that I believe currently ID comes down to being convinced of an intelligent design in all things (including rocks, planetary rotations, single-celled organisms, chemical stabilities, and human life). If all we are concerned with is the intelligent design of man, the answer could be an alien species, but then the question of how that intelligent being was designed, wherein the ultimate designer must be “above design”, and if intelligence entails design, then too must the ultimate designer have always existed. If he did not always exist, then he could not become intelligent without being intelligently designed, which would make him obviously, not the ultimate designer of whom we desire to know (much like the Kleiner/Sherlock discussion on the unmoved mover).
It seems too difficult to try to explain origin, without conceiving of a necessary miracle, unless physical forces and materials have, like energy, neither been created nor destroyed, but simply undergo constant change. YEC, and their like, bother me in the same way; their reason for disagreement with what is evident is due to the assumed implications, and their impact. The very real possibility that people do not consider is that at any point God like Kleiner’s may exist, and no person be made aware. Hard determinism may be true, and a God like this could still exist outside time and space, still able to affect the material world in ways which, when measured, might only confuse us as to the causal origins. God may have created all things and is watching from his throne. He may have created all things and is actively participating in a continuing creation/relationship which would be consistent with both diving providence and some theories of theistic evolution. He may have only created life either from nothing or from materials in existence, or like the Mormons’ God(s), it may be a greater race of beings that sent its “apes” to a planet to grow and become more and then somehow collect them in an afterlife. I do not think any of these are the case, but all are possible and plausible at least individually, even in the face of evolution and causal determinism. However, as long as these theories are based on little to no observation, they do not belong in the “science” classrooms. “Intelligent Design” and “World Religions” courses perhaps should be made more available in public high school education.
I found Kieth Ward to very well written, and his epistemic humility admirable. I also enjoyed Roberts as he thoroughly ripped on YEC through geologic time references. While I did not think Roberts was entirely persuasive on his rhetoric arguments in bashing creationists, I do agree with him on some statements about ID. One major point is that ID commonly uses inductive logic/reasoning, which is a dangerous leap, leaving them open to horrific bouts of scoffing. Even when they do not use inductive reasoning, they establish their goal, not of seeking the truth whatever it may be, but of working from the biased goal of affirming their pre-established beliefs.
Dembski and Swineburg were boring, but mostly because their arguments rehashed that of early chapters and of Barr’s opinions rivaled with my own. However, I was entertained by Earman and Dembski’s reflections on eliminative inductivists, which sadly, nobody has time to get into (including me).
As far as Bradley is concerned, he and Nicholas Wade present information, both toward complexity, and toward the improbability of life existing at all. Both theories I have argued again and again, but they are two of the major discrepancies in question. Complexity does not happen all at once, or in a very short time, but through adaptation. Improbability of life existing from the survival of budding environmental processes has little to no effect given that we do not have a sample size with which to observe. We do not know how vast the universe is, or the ratio in which life inhabits planets in our current state of our current universe, or how often life starts up and stops throughout time, or even how many times universes have come and gone. Probability relies on these factors.
Behe, though rehashing much of the previously argued points, excerpts Miller (357) on the subtlety in which it would be possible for God to work through Quantum “instability” (if that is the right way to put it), wherein a Sherlockian God might divinely provide and act upon our physical world (necessary if He retained Kleinerian qualities putting Him outside space and time) in a manner paralleling that of the movie, “What the bleep do we know?” He would effectively allow for a Kleiner attributed God to act upon man through Sherlockian providence, by means of Quantum instability of existence, and offers that such could be seen as the mutations in evolution, working down the line of causality to efficiently provide, thus making everyone except YEC happy. (I might have made up the causality part.)
Meyer finishes up the book with the conceivable theory of the Cambrian explosion being the place and time of the creation of life. This is totally fathomable and interesting (like Pangaea) from a non-YEC viewpoint, but as previously mentioned, cannot fit for those who do not believe in the dating methods, in which case one might ask, “What’s a Cambrian?”

12/2/2006

Biomedical Ethics MidTerm

Filed under: — site admin @ 8:47 pm
1. Brain death is viewed in our text in two different ways. The first type is termed: entire brain death, “brain dead”, and “whole-brain-dead.” These kind have experience brain death even in the brain stem to the point that respiration and heartbeat can no longer be controlled by the brain (ALS -Advanced Life Support- machines are necessary to promote life without promoting consciousness). The second type is where patients’ brains stems still provide respiration and cardiopulmonary activity sufficient to sustain unconscious life. The second type is called PVS or “Persistent Vegetative State.” In either case, there remains irreversible brain damage to the effect that consciousness and cognitive functions (including memory) will never be regained (Mappes-Degrazia 303).
Bernard Gert and his colleague believe that death cannot be viewed as process, but an instance or an event. The sentence the text uses regarding the “organism as a whole” can be misleading read out of context. They believe death is when the whole organism stops functioning, not when the organism stops functioning as a whole. They think this perception is highly important ethically; they want us to understand what it means to keep alive or kill an organism as opposing the sustaining or killing of a person. They differentiate that the organism is always a living human until the entire organism is dead. However, once the conscious and cognitive functions of the human are fully depleted or degenerated, the person in the human no longer remains. Patients in a permanent vegetative state are still human, but are no longer persons, and no longer need the care that we would hope be provided to all persons (M-D 312-313).
James Bernat and associates are more interested in the definition of death as defined above (whole brain death). They hope for mankind that science has provided them a sufficient understanding of death through empirical means. However, this view of brain death is not practical, and does not provide for the ethical provisions of the medical field. There are too many living to keep those who are not social persons (those contributing in, and even able to participate in their social roles, as well as in any other way, except as a burden), alive at the expense of the living. This is especially so, when there are many others in need of medical support, who are suffering and aware of it. Needless to say, I think Gert fits my point of view in all practical matters, as well as helping to establish his agreement about death, but not about how to treat the “near dead.”
2. Living wills are a form of advanced (health) directive, usually created with the help of a medical lawyer, or lawyer and doctor. The purpose is to inform the living or those responsible for care, in cases of unconsciousness or loss of brain functions, as to the person’s desired path of care. These directives can include: DNR (Do Not Resuscitate) orders, desire to refuse treatment, and sometimes to the extremes of not providing even food or water. Living wills can also direct as to which life sustaining machines they desire to be or not to be hooked up to, and in which physical cases for such directives to be applied or refused.
Durable Power of Attorney is an authorization for the power to make legal decisions for someone, in this case regarding health care, in a situation where the person is decided to be unconscious, mentally incompetent to decide for themselves, or is no longer able to decide to do lacking brain function. This is a dangerous move for those who have trouble trusting others, or for those who have odd desires or disagreeable desires. However, I would think that in most cases, a person would give power of attorney to their spouse, ex-wife, brother, mother, or whoever is most trusted to carry out desires you would want done for yourself.
Personally, I plan to leave a living will regarding brain damage or PVS, but have personally considered giving durable power of attorney to my brother, as I believe my mother would do her best to keep me alive no matter what. My brother on the other hand has been unofficially instructed to do me in through active means rather than passive means, but to use his best judgment in how to end my suffering, if getting himself into trouble is a great threat.
3. The Sherlockian argument for the problem with non-treatment of defective newborns is primarily that it begs the question, and definition of what handicaps should be treated, what handicaps should not be treated, and what constitute handicaps? I believe there are great moral discrepancies in our culture whenever life and death are on the line, especially in the case of “innocents” –people for whom life and death is to be decided upon despite having not been guilty of heinous atrocities. So, this indeed requires us to establish a line, but we cannot simply obliterate the directive that “newborns, born with handicaps, should get maximum treatment.” We would have to add “except…” Establishing the line and what counts for the exception is extremely difficult because while many parents (though they struggle) love their “Down’s syndrome” children, many others are fine with raising children of various ailments. Still there those who could not stand to have to deal with a handicapped child or in some cases would not desire their children to go through the pain and stress of some defects (apparently, achondroplasia, or disproportionate dwarfism, is a very painful handicap physically as well as socially).
My argument is that once you start killing them (not treating them), where do you draw the line and where do you stop? However, I think this slippery-slope argument is a moot point in light of the fact that defining where to stop and start is probably too complex an argument to even draw the line at. This may be the case for sometime, if not forever in our society. Since people have the right to have their babies, yet some may not want them. I guess there will always be adoption.
4. Active euthanasia is killing through direct action for the purpose of discontinuing the suffering of a patient through discontinuing his life. Passive euthanasia is killing through indirect action for the purpose of discontinuing the suffering of a patient through discontinuing his life. The difference is not just directly versus indirectly, and both are usually considered premeditated action/inaction. Yet, passive commonly refers to the lack of provision of care to the point where nature will take its own course, and if the patient can survive without your added care, he will survive, if he cannot, then he dies, but you didn’t really kill him (directly) since he would have died anyway (said the minimally acceptable Samaritan). Active euthanasia, as defined in our class, is the direct killing of an individual through active means. These include: pulling the plug, turning off life sustaining machines, beheadings, pillows over the patients face with nurses are not looking, and more. However, active euthanasia, while arguably more humane than starvation and dehydration, is not often permitted, because it sets a bad precedent, and it is often thought abhorrent when done in a way that increases pain briefly to diminish consistent pain completely (such as shooting your dying friend, or pulling the knife back out of him to let the blood flow out sooner –putting him out of his misery).
Rachels, though not specified in the question, believes there is no moral distinction between killing and allowing to die (“All that is necessary for evil to triumph is that good men do nothing” ~Edmund Burke) (“With great power comes great responsibility” ~Uncle Ben, Amazing Spider-Man) Maybe fitting these quotes is a bit of stretch, but I think they both promote actively helping someone, or else facing moral culpability. In our euthanasia topic, “helping” should be understood as ending the pain (M-D 380).
Callahan, on the other hand, believes it is never the physician’s role to kill; rather, it the physician’s role “only to cure or comfort, never to kill.” He does believe there is a moral difference between killing and allowing to die, but does not specify how. It seems to me that he distinguishes them between what he believes is permissible to physician’s role and what is not. In other words, a physician can try to help, and can fail at helping, but can never decide that killing is the “fix” for the problem. I agree with him to the point that this sets a bad precedent, to have doctors killing people. The largest concern is the fear that people will have in doctor visitations, especially old people, if they believe the doctors may just kill them. This may seem ridiculous, but the fear is there in the minds of old people even now. My grandmother does not want to go to the hospital for any more surgeries; she wants to live, but all of her friends died in hospitals on the beds. She does not want to go there to die if it is just her time to die, but also, her paranoia leads her to believe that the doctors had something to do with the deaths of her friends (M-D 380).
Brock disagrees with Callahan’s main points that killing is inherently wrong, is incompatible with a physician’s role, and systematic acceptance of active euthanasia is detrimental to society. Brock believes that it may very well be the moral responsibility of physicians to actively terminate the voluntary patients. He believes that it is cruel to refuse the plea of a patient in pain to help him end it through death, and that autonomous choices, even to die, should be respected, and where the choice, will, and cessation of pain exist, no harm is done (M-D 381).
I personally agree with Callahan that it is incompatible with a physicians’ role to actively and passively “ice” patients. It is an autonomous choice, but one that should not be put in the hands of someone who does not want to. I should not ask my doctor to kill me in great pain, as its stress on someone I do not know, who does not need deaths on his conscience. His work is too important. However, if it is my autonomous decision to ask a loved one to kill me, then if their decision to take part is autonomous and congruent, it should not be interfered with by law. I disagree with Callahan that killing is inherently wrong, but I do agree that systematic acceptance of euthanasia may be detrimental to society if not done with great care. I disagree with Brock that it is the moral responsibility of a doctor to refuse a patients plea for aid in death (in as far as active and passive euthanasia go.) However, doctor-assisted euthanasia to the point where a morphine button or enough pills to do the job are prescribed to a patient is not a length at which the doctor has killed anyone as long as he informs them on the possible results of overdosing. I also disagree with Brock to the extent that I believe it is inhumane, not to ask, but for someone to expect another person to go through the trauma of having to help kill him, unless this is the type of offense and request that could be imposed on and proposed to a loved one (if my dog gets too sick and is in constant pain, I plan to take him to a beautiful spot in South Willow Canyon and tell him about the rabbits) (M-D 401).
5. The Supreme Court decided on two cases about assisted suicide: Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill. In the first case, the issue is whether Washington’s ban of assisted suicide violates Due Process in the Fourteenth Amendment (protecting rights of peoples and protecting their autonomy, against the possible interference of the government). Rehnquist obviously held that the Fourteenth amendment didn’t allow for a right, nor should it be interpreted as such, to physician assisted suicide. To boot, Casey and Cruzan argued a constitutional “right to die” and to end in a humane way in which one would desire to die (M-D 404-406).
In the second case, much like the first, they try to beat the system with a claim to the Equal protection clause of the constitution. Rehnquist responds to this that it has been made possible for the removal of life-sustaining treatment, and there is an “important and logical” distinction between removing life support and helping people die. Here, Rehnquist denies the contention that allowing one and not the other is not treating terminal patients equally (M-D 409-411).
O’Connor makes a great point that the argument in both cases is a waste of time for the purpose that patients have no legal barriers from being given sufficient pain meds to knock them unconscious and hasten their deaths. However, I believe that this is far less easy to attain for terminal patients than it should be, and that there does indeed exist a constitutional right (as in the Vacco v. Quill case) for everyone to be allowed to equal opportunity to take an abundance of pain meds in order to die when and how they wish (M-D 413).
6. Miller and his band of cautious ruffians make some good points. However, their points on this issue are not universal. I agree that physician assisted death, as regulated in Oregon is a good start, and is good that it has moved slowly and cautiously. But, we do need to move further in some way. Many people that need and want this release cannot receive it (even in Oregon). It is far too limiting, but it is a start. Miller also believes this. His cronies believe that while it should be extended past the terminally ill, it should be a last resort, reserved only for those whose care can no longer provide relief to the pain of living with their respective conditions (M-D 426).
I do agree with Miller that the legalized regulation may reduce abuses, but not always. I am reasonably certain that deaths related to alcoholic influence were far less common and less percentage wise during the prohibition than they are now. I forget the most recent statistics, but I believe in Salt Lake City, that for every 6 cars on the road during the weekend between 11 at night to 4 in morning, 2 are intoxicated drivers, 3 are not, and 1 is a cop. That could be wrong, but abuse of regulated items is indeed in excess all over the place. Many pharmaceuticals and over the counter drugs are used as party drugs, or are mixed for abusive purposes (I have a friend that is under house arrest after being caught with $30,000 worth of prescription meds and $13,000 in cash in his front room. He represents not only his own abuse, but that of everyone who bought from him. He is one of many like him).
Arras proposes a two pronged slippery-slope argument opposing the legalization of assisted suicide. His first argument is that when one makes parameters for the legalization, it then becomes easier to widen and extend those parameters. His second argument is that once any legal means is set forth, abuse will happen and be found legal or excusable under the established legal availabilities. He also believes that truly effective oversight will not be reached despite the cover of security that assisted suicide folks believe is possible.
Arras makes good points, but I disagree with him for a reason that he does not mention, nor does Miller. Abuse happens because people want it to. These people are criminally minded. The laws already in place do not stop them from abusing trust, killing patients, now and then, legally or illegally, for fun or for assistance. The problem is that since abuse is happening now, and there is no oversight to convict (even Kavorkian got away with it, although I don’t believe he was criminally minded). However, with legalization comes the regulation and oversight. People are getting away with what is considered a crime right now. Some of them do it unethically as well as illegally. But, because there is no regulation or legalization, it is all simply overlooked. People are just not ready yet under the current legal parameters to deal with the problems. Before many of the popular drugs of the 60’s and 70’s were made illegal, and some legal with regulations, they were constantly abused. The abuse continues even with the legal ones partly because it is not legal enough, and partly because there is no oversight with the regulation (I believe the statistic is that one in four people in the U.S. have tried marijuana, but I forget how many claim to continue to use).
Overall, I go with Miller’s reasoning, but I see a parallel to Living Wills and Durable Power of Attorney here. Sandra Day O’Connor’s position on pain meds is like a trusting and open ability for autonomy paralleling. Miller on the other hand, seeks a Living Will type method, where letter of the law is held, and used, but where spirit of the choice of directives may be overlooked. O’Connor’s theory provides for the adaptation of current medicine and loved ones to help make the choice to hold down the morphine button for their invalid family member. Miller, on the other hand, leaves his argument open to the possible downfalls mentioned by Arrras.

Aborted Fetus: The Other White Meat

Filed under: — site admin @ 8:43 pm
In the past I have tried my best to avoid tackling the controversial issue of abortion. The primary reasons are that I was raised very conservatively, yet have always been more liberally minded. For this reason, and undoubtedly for naturalistic biological reasons, I experience, in some sense, disturbance at the death of the most innocent of my species. It is natural that one would not want the death of a child of its own kind, not without some confound or motivation. Even with such a motivation, it is rarely the case, albeit sometimes pertinent, that the destruction of a newborn (infant or fetus) is justified either for the sake of the newborn, or in carrying out justice against the crimes of the newborn. I believe something about our ethics, morals, and/or our natural instincts let us know that the destruction of the lives of our own kind is rarely done selflessly.

My second and probably more poignant reason for withdrawing from the topic of abortion is that the society in which I live gives little value to my opinion as a male. While I may have the potential to enlighten the females in my life to my views on abortion, or petition and vote toward changing laws about abortion; I still have no direct “say” in what happens in abortion offices. I would compare it to one slave asking another slave, both having no voting rights in the next election, for whom the other would vote. While they may have a response, their response holds virtually no significance, and may be considered a waste of time.

I have personally tried to flesh out my perspectives due to my denial of morality as a whole. At best, I speak only of ethics, and when referring to right and wrong, I do so with regards to transgressing the social contracts under which we live. I am a naturalist in this sense, and side with many of Hobbes’ ideas about ethics. However, as said above, I do not think it is necessary that children die or are “preempted” for selfish reasons.

Bob and Linda are a perfect example of the need for change in our education and our laws. Bob had no say in the destruction of his child (I do not know at what stage life, human life, or a possible soul could become a part of the embryo, but since it is obviously a gradual processes, despite the observable punctuations in development, it is all alive. The sperm and the egg were both biological, living substances with the teleological purpose to create a living human.). While Bob and the family may have been selfish in wanting the child to live simply for their own fulfillment of needs or desires, it is obvious that this was the case for Linda. Everyone here is being selfish, and yet it is made to sound as though Bob believes he is thinking for the sake of a would-be person as well. Apparently Linda is more concerned about having the type of career she wants than the needs of the child growing inside of her; these needs include her continued proper care for her body, dieting, and possibly missing out on a career for some length of time. I take Bob’s side in the issue simply because he has the right to act selfishly in this manner, since he entered into the contract of marriage with someone who believed as he did about the issue of abortion when he entered into the contract. For this reason he did not include in the vows, “until you abort my unborn child, do we part”, which he may have done if this appeared likely with Linda. In that sense, I believe she broke the contract by changing in what Bob, and the previous, “premarital” Linda, would have both considered a drastic way. I believe by having the abortion she should expect to have her husband leave her and take the kids as well; taking them on the grounds of abortion and that she cannot be expected to take care of children what with her new career –as she made obvious through her reasoning of the decision to abort her freshest offspring. Overall, I believe she was hasty and selfish.

I would like to point out that I do believe that abortion is killing; it is a degree of killing, yet it is a premeditated killing of a lower form of life. If one were to stab Terry Shiavo to death (back when she was “alive”) it could be reasonably argued that this is a lesser form of murder than killing someone who still had a life to live. While the brain-dead are less significantly human (existentially and for societal purposes of utility) than are those who are healthy, so is it the case that unborn children, even newly born children are less than healthy individuals in some regards. (This might be argued successfully to me, that from the perspective of innocence or honor, children have not broken as many contracts with others. And, as may be opposed to that of healthy beings, that neither a baby nor an “invalid” is in a position with which to arm and defend his or her self.) While I believe abortion to be a lesser form of murder, I do not believe that murder is innately wrong. I believe it is wrong with regards to our society and with regards to our species. Also, I feel this way about abortion with regards to the “right to life” issue. We are but advanced animals, subject to nature and to the animals around us. The rights that are ours are not sovereign, but are merely those which we take for ourselves, or are bestowed upon us by those with the power to bestow and enforce them (America is only free as long as it has the social integrity and safe-balances to remain internally free, and the military power to keep it free from external threats.) The only right to life that an unborn child and an invalid have is that right which he can attain for himself (not much), or that which others can bestow upon it (such as a mother protecting and “growing” the child). To sum up this facet, I do not think it is appropriate to equate what one has the “power” to do with what one has the “right” to do. The problem in terms here is that rights should be spoken about as society-defined rights, such as the constitutional agreement that we have the right to bear arms. While the views of “right to lifers” more closely parallel the medical field’s mandate to “do no harm” than does those fighting for the rights to choose to abort babies, their views should not be allowed in the discussion with regards to children having “God given” rights to life. There are no rights (observed by my previous definition of rights) that we as a society do not provide. If God does provide them, let God not let man put them asunder.

From my perspective, without morality, God, and innate rights, why is it the woman’s choice to decide the outcome of the child being created by both the man and woman? A small voice in the background shouts, “It’s her body.” Yet, the embryo belongs to both of them. Simply, because the law currently allows her to decide for herself how to deal with the “effects” of their actions, she is permitted to destroy their property and child. I hate to say it, but here is yet another slippery-slope step of the results from which the Catholic Church tried to stray its sheep for so many years (which instructed that sexual intercourse be used only for the propagation of the species). The fact is that they did the deed, and they did not succeed with whatever form of contraceptives were used. They did have an understanding that neither of them thought abortion would ever be an option. So, she did what many promiscuous single women do (and men would too if the biological setup were reversed); she cleaned up the mess. Selfishness and recklessness are greatly promoted through the concept and presence of abortion.

I see a huge problem here that reminds me of bulimia nervosa. That problem is a resounding, “Oops!” followed by desire to sweep the problem under the rug rather than face the natural consequences. Abortion is a hit and run. More specifically it is binging and purging. People no longer have the accident of failing to plan, they go far worse and plan to fail. They are taught that irresponsibility is permissible; people make mistakes. Rather than becoming more responsible, better people, who think more often and thoroughly, plan more efficiently, and act with more wisdom, people merely do what they feel like. There is money to be made in selling the safety nets of others mistakes.

I do not condemn contraceptives, I think they are great way to add pleasure to peoples lives, without necessarily overpopulating the world, or without forcing the irresponsible to raise such a high percentage of our future generations (a huge problem I do not have time to get into). However, when using contraceptives, one must expect and plan for them to fail at their purpose (this is what smart people do). If one absolutely does not want a child, then sterilization or a vasectomy are the obvious fail-safes. If this is too much to ask, then abstinence is another secure option. Otherwise, expect that having sex will eventually result in its intended results -babies. Being dim-witted and irresponsible is the most common excuse for the desire for abortion (while I understand there are those cases in which life must be abhorrent for a child to have to live with certain illnesses, or cases in which a developed, otherwise healthy mother’s life is at stake; both of which may lead to the possible decision to abort).

Abortion largely offends me, not because it is killing, which it may as well be (arguing the point shows devious motives), but the reasons why people are partaking in what may be a slippery slope destruction of our way of life. Killing children at any unborn stage is simply a step toward killing children at higher stages, until one day we are killing newborns, 3 year olds, anyone under 16. I’m not trying to be dramatic, but when something considered socially, or biologically sacred is brought into question, it must be acted upon with caution, done with much deliberation and reflection. It should not be taken as easy as, “I slept with that jerk; I don’t want to have his baby.” It should not rest on things such as, “Well it is just not the right time in my career for a baby.” (Note that the reasons for having an abortion are to destroy a child, not to keep from having a fetus. The reasons for an abortion make the argument that they are not children impotent, so to speak. The reasons for abortion are not for the annihilation of what is not a baby, but for the direct purpose of annihilating the baby, as well as its inclusion into their lives –in the form of needful human being.)

I would never desire to have one of my potential offspring aborted (this is saying a lot considering my campaign against children, and slogan of “No Babies!”) However, if my contraceptives did not work, I would default in knowing that I had planned for such a day, and should contraceptives fail, I led a life which I knew might result in having to love and care for a child, at which time I would be happy to do so. Yet, my “say” might mean nothing if the woman I married thought otherwise or changed since the time I meant to marry her. For this reason, Bill and Linda have a much greater problem than that of whether they agree or disagree on abortion, but whether her desire for a career means more to her than her family and their opinions. Furthermore, we as a society have some thinking to do with regards to abortion. Is it really that much easier to abort a potentially healthy child in the womb for the sake of irresponsibility, than it is to help suffering, terminally ill patients pass on, relieved of their pain?


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